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Abstract 
We discuss  the  determinants of FDI over the regions of a large economy like India, and develop a 
framework drawn from the advantage concept of Kindleberger and from location theories rooted in regional 
science. We specifically use Stephen Hymer’s understanding of the parallels and relationship between the 
international organisation of a global firm and the locational choices for the same with the spatial aspects of 
location of economic activities in general.  We apply the same to the situation in India of large FDI flows 
since the reform began in 1991-92 to arrive at a tentative explanation of the regional patterns of FDI. 
Essentially we argue that for all investments (other than those strictly confined to locations due to their 
requirements of either natural resources or the need to be very close to markets) it is the regions with 
metropolitan cities, that have the advantage in ‘headquartering’ the country operations of MNCs in India, 
that therefore attract the bulk of FDI. Even more than the quantum of FDI, the number of cases of FDI, as 
also the employment effects, and spillover effects are large for such regions. Empirical support for this 
hypothesis is provided by a study of the foreign investment intentions, and the distribution of investment 
projects. 
 
Gujarat has been particularly handicapped in not having a large and metropolitan city unlike the southern 
states which have Bangalore, and Hyderabad besides t he older metropolis of Chennai. The area around 
Delhi, and Maharashtra its two metropolitian cities - Mumbai and Pune, have large advantage. Adjusting for 
these factors the FDI into Gujarat was large enough over the period when the state had grown rapidly in the 
first six years following the reform of 1991-92. Since then the slow down of the growth has been a retardant 
to FDI since the kind of FDI that Gujarat can hope for are largely industrially oriented. Similarly regulatory 
uncertainty especially with regard to gas, but also electric power and more generally in  the physical 
infrastructure sectors had hurt Gujarat more than other states. 
 
We conclude by suggesting  that there are vast gains to be made by attracting FDI, especially in services, 
high tech, and skilled labour seeking  industries, because then the resulting operations are more externally 
oriented, and the investments arise from competing firms. Gujarat  therefore needs to worry about these 
investments can come about. Its fortunes are likened very closely with the growth of manufacturing in the 
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A Study of the Regional Determinants of Foreign Direct 






GLOBAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN FDI (SOME CLARIFICATIONS) 
 
It is widely believed that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the less developed 
economies (LDCs) have risen sharply in the nineties, and has therefore become an 
autonomous and dynamic actor in the industrialisation and accelerated growth of economies. 
The fact that many of the fastest growing economies show large increases in FDI have no 
doubt gone down to ensure the ‘truth’ of this proposition. Besides the spill over benefits of 
FDI an argument rife in the eighties, the resources - both savings and investment - 
contribution of FDI have come back to the agenda of observers of developing economies. 
FDI being non debt creating, in the post Latin-American debt crisis, and now in the post east 
Asian crisis periods, has come to be seen as more desirable than other kinds of capital flows 
especially borrowings, and is seen as being automatically hedged against downturns since 
capital flight during downturns cannot happen without much capital loss, or so it is contented. 
Indeed, FDI flows are themselves seen as indicators of positive happenings in an economy 
and of even its basis. Though contending the above understanding is not our primary agenda 
in this paper, we need to point out that: 
 
Asian Dynamism Drives FDI 
(1)  A large part of the dynamism of FDI especially in regard to the developing economies 
is only because of Asia, where FDI has typically followed growth, rather than being an 
initiator or cause of growth. The origins and the cause of  the high-speed growth  lie in the 
pursuit of export oriented growth, in the land reforms that were carried out early to relax the 
home market constraints and in the umpteen interventions by the state to ensure that resource 
allocation was in keeping with dynamic comparative advantage. Moreover it is well known 
                                                 
2Part I of the Report titled A Study of Foreign Direct Investments in Gujarat Covering the 
Macroeconomic Determinants was earlier submitted as draft report to the Government of 
Gujarat, 15
th February 2004. The author thanks the Government of Gujarat for the support to 
the Study 
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that as much as 80 to 85% of the Chinese FDI is merely cross hauling or round tripping of 
home originating Chinese investments and investments by Hong Kong and Taiwanese and 
Chinese businesses, so that only 15% of so of this reported US$45b or so is real FDI in the 
more usual sense of the term. And that is rather small in relation to the growth in the Chinese 
markets and no higher than in India, widely perceived to be a laggard in the case of FDI. 
(2)  The cross national links and the tie ups of the Chinese bourgeoisie which span the 
countries of East Asia and South East Asia is the prime basis for FDI in the region. Thus 
Taiwanese FDI into Hong Kong or China is larger than US or Japanese, and so more than 
foreign, it is merely the expression of integration of the Chinese bourgeoisie across the 
region. Otherwise the extreme local affinity for FDI in the region in contrast to trade – being 
about a hundred times more than ‘predicted’ by standard source-destination determinants 
studies can hardly be accounted for. 
 
Need to Exclude Intra European ‘FDI’ 
(3)  A lot of the buoyancy of FDI in general is merely the result of large intra-European 
flows especially since 1992. This is when the European Union took concrete shape with some 
unification of policy, law and most importantly of the currency, and a near complete 
elimination of the intra-union barriers to trade.  Since FDI is very much a currency 
phenomenon (Aliber, Z. A., 1970), it stands to reason that intra-union flows of investment 
should have been excluded in the tabulation of global FDI flows. 
 
With such adjustments as also the scaling down of the Chinese FDI to its correct level of 
about US$10b, there is no evidence that FDI flows have shown a sustained increase in the 
rates achieved in previous periods.  This is reinforced when the large cyclicalities inherent to 
FDI flows are recognised and adjusted for. 
 
(4)  A fairly large part of the FDI into Latin America which in the seventies and early 
eighties used to be the principal LDC destination for FDI was constituted by debt equity 
swaps especially in the first half of the eighties. Real flows of total resources transferred on 
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THE CHANGING ROLE OF FDI 
 
Yet in a certain different way that is not widely recognised FDI may have become a more 
dynamic agent (and aspect) in the growth and changes in the developing economies. The 
emergence of pluralism in the sources of FDI since the large rise of Japanese FDI in the late 
eighties, the fall in the share of the US as home country to a more normal level of about 25 to 
30% from its earlier share closer to 50%, its rise as perhaps the most important destination 
country, have all been quite significant. The pluralism has continued with the rise of 
Germany, the European economies and East Asian firms. While the quantum of FDI involved 
from the latter country firms is not large, the output or trade that these have engendered is 
large, since it tends to take on smaller shares and even non-equity forms. And the spillovers 
from these forms are very large  since the associated source countries have pursued export led 
growth policies.  They are much more from competitive firms,  are host country export 
oriented, trade creating and import replacing when factor costs so justify. This contrasts with 
the more home market orientation of  FDI from the traditional sources of Europe, US and 
Canada. They tend to bring in the complimentary factors to create tradable output out of 
factor endowments in the host countries. Ozawa (1993) and Kojima (1978) had been pointing 
out this aspect of Japanese investment especially in the LDCs. Besides the market access that 
they bring when export oriented, the severe competition that comes along often from the 
same country firms means that the surpluses lost to foreign investors by way of high returns 
on moderately productive investments is hardly there. Since these countries typically come 
up against Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and other forms of protectionist measures in 
Europe and the US, where their first markets usually are, their FDI in developing economies 
later in the industrial transformation, often amounts to relocation to get beyond such 
restraints, which can be of great benefit to the recipient country, especially when short of 
entrepreneurship and technology. 
 
Much Competition in the Sources of FDI 
More generally FDI and the technology that comes with it today arise from competing 
industries.  This is especially so since the older linkages and comfort of past colonial contact 
etc have given way to levellise the entry cost for potential entrants across a wide variety of 
countries. As costs of entry have fallen due inter-alia to liberal policy and the pluralism in 
FDI, emergence of international risk reducing arrangements, the freer play of markets, 
increased tradability of goods and services, unbundling of hitherto bundled activities, the  
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rents in FDI (especially in manufacturing industries) have declined significantly. The 
commoditisation of everything taken up for manufacture by the East Asians generally, and 
the FDI that has resulted from these highly cost competitive enterprises that these economies 
have engendered have had their impact on FDI more broadly, reducing the rental value of 
ownership assets of FDI to the owner, while increasing its social value in the recipient 
country. 
 
Extractive Industries and Rents Decline 
The share of FDI in extractive industries (as also the share of extractive industries more 
generally in global GDP) has gone down. Even in extractive industries, the decline in vertical 
integration, replacement of control through ownership with (willing) contractual relationship, 
the emergence of markets however imperfect they are to externalise the transactions earlier 
within global firms (especially in energy and in those producing natural materials), multiple 
suppliers and sources, have again all reduced the rent opportunities in FDI. 
 
The movement to a more liberal economy in the seventies, but especially in the eighties has 
meant that FDI firms which earlier were protected are now subject to import competition.  
This naturally reduces the rents in value added by FDI. This has followed earlier decades of 
import substitution with MNCs being significant participants in such import substitution  
(which often amounted to tariff jumping). 
 
Privatisation Drives FDI 
The movement away from the public enterprise in most emerging economies (when state 
intervention has had its own problems of failure), has resulted in greater systemic optimality. 
Indeed, had the IMF stabilisations and the monetary policies not been so conservative and 
orthodox, the important structural change of the movement away from an inefficient public 
sector could have been greatly facilitated. With faster economic expansion rather than 
contraction, the otherwise difficult task of privatisation is rendered feasible and politically 
acceptable.  In privatisation, FDI has had a major role and were important in bringing about 
commercial orientation in these enterprises. This is especially true in Eastern Europe. Herein 
the integration with Europe, provided a most favourable macro environment to bring back the 
markets.  FDI was absolutely necessary even in utilities to play this historically necessary 
role of integration with European markets.   
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This is because such ex-communist countries almost entirely lacked a private stector.  In 
Latin America with no such positive macro economic factors, but instead under the yoke of 
the IMF mediated contractions,  had to bring about painful privatisation with smaller  than 
otherwise possible role from local enterprise.  Thus much of the  FDI in utilities would not 
have resulted without sweetened contracts with the state. The macro policies which raised the 
cost of capital for domestic enterprise would have restricted the ability of local firms to 
participate in such privatisations. 
 
Enhanced Functionality Under Export Led Growth 
In the manufacturing export led growth of the East Asian economies, FDI had played a small 
direct role, especially in the spectacular cases of Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. But in 
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia, initially FDI from Japan and the US in the so called run 
away industries, and later from Korea and Taiwan played a very important role.  This was not 
necessarily by large equity shares and direct control of the enterprises producing for export, 
but through arrangements that included original equipment manufacture (OEM), international 
subcontracting, and minority share holding by trading entities (Shoga Shosas, and chaebols). 
These systems and arrangements now underlie the export of manufactures from China, where 
additionally ex-SOEs now functioning similarly to the Shoga Shosas play a very dynamic 
role. 
 
Similarly in the Central American economies, the runaway industries from the US both 
having FDI and taking non-equity forms in Mexico, Brazil, had been dynamic factors in these 
countries’ export growth. These include the so called maquiladora industries. That they were 
unable to use these arrangements and exports for industrial transformation is another matter 
that concerns their macro-policies and orientation of the state, and is no reflection of the 
potential of such FDI (and non-equity arrangements) in engendering exports, and creating 
trade. 
 
FDI in the Export of Services 
Perhaps the biggest positive influence of FDI and related forms of arrangements  is just 
beginning and entails the services sector, and has the potential to  increase and scale up the 
exports of non-factor services (but embodying labour in a richer way than in export of 
commodities), from economies that have shown a reluctance to adopt export led growth 
policies.  
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In the globalisation of economic activities, the services sector posed a particular problem, 
because tradability of many of the services was limited, and they had to be produced and 
delivered at the point of use (consumption). Most manufactured commodities are in contrast 
tradable. As the competitiveness of Asia including late industrialising East Asia rose in the 
eighties, the advanced west realising the asymmetry posed by the lack of tradability in many 
services where it seemed to have the comparative advantage, brought services on the agenda 
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs  (GATT), against the vehement opposition of 
the developing countries. And despite the opposition (GATS) or the General Agreement of 
Trade in Services which became part of the WTO Agreement.  The US and the advanced 
countries wanted the developing economies to open up their services sectors, especially  
banking and finance, but also insurance, management, real estate, business services including 
consultancy, accounting, advertising, and technical services to FDI since local presence was 
seen as necessary to provide the services, where it was presumed the source country had the 
advantage. 
 
FDI in services showed the largest increase in the second half of the eighties, and nineties in 
response to the liberalisation and opening up of the services sectors globally to FDI. While 
the largest portions of the resulting FDI in services were intra-advanced country, much like 
FDI in manufacturing, significant investments in banking, and financial services, and in 
business services especially advertising took place in the developing economies. Japanese 
service oriented investments in other developed countries during this period, included those 
in banking, trade, retailing, and distribution services especially those related to Japanese 
exports, besides some spectacular investments in the entertainment sector. 
 
The Rise of IT Industries and Tradability of Services 
All along but especially since the PC revolution began, in the early eighties, developments in 
measurability, in computation, in communication, in standardisation, in speed and capacity of 
electronic and computing equipment, in digitisation, had been improving the prospects for 
division of activities hitherto integral, into distinct activities which could then each be 
separately and across distance carried out perhaps in sequence, and reintegrated (or linked) to 
deliver the overall service. Similarly communication developments, switching speeds and 
falling costs crucially underlay the development of off shore transcription, then call centres, 
and now more generally business process  sourcing. It is a small development from here to  
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the remote provision of certain consumer services like remote video checking, booking and 
umpteen other counter services, where physical goods are not involved.  Business process 
outsourcing (BPO) itself includes many possibilities that are difficult to visualise today and 
would unfold only as the  industry develops. With video phone many more such counter 
services including remote personal banking become possible to. While it is still not possible 
for a barber to sit here in India and do the hair of a rich client in the US, the improved 
tradability of services creates an enormous opportunity for further growth of services, and for 
FDI and related arrangements especially the latter to play a necessarily positive role in the 
growth and development of late industrialising economies. 
 
Services being less dependent on inputs (other than capital investments which are made at the 
start of the business), are less vulnerable to exchange rate misalignment  (mismanagement) , 
possible in late industrialising economies, and so could expand in a variety of countries and 
not just those pursuing export led growth policies.  While initially barriers arising out of 
variation in accents and language are likely to be strong, as more of the labour/ skilled labour 
intensive operations go offshore, the space is indeed large for a meaningful and beneficial 
globalisation. The generally competitive structure of most service industries means that 
bandwagon effects are most likely, since to match to the (significantly) lower costs of an 
enterprise that has already gone in for off shore operations, others would have to follow suit.  
Policy restrictions are possible, and this would be the initial reaction of rich  countries, who 
would see jobs being “exported”.  Implementation of restriction though would require 
innovative monitoring and other developments in reporting, and transparency in corporates’ 
internal functioning that would go against the norms of business in a free society. These 
would also amount to anti-trade or restrictive measure and against the spirit of GATS/WTO. 
MNCs already in BPO and more generally in outsourcing of services  would, in this 
ideological and political battle, be on the side of natural evolution and against imposed 
restrictions on tradability. Interestingly such restrictions would impose much efficiency 
penalty since they would, to be effective, not only have to restrict “offshoring" but also 
outsourcing (even domestically) as such. The economics of the initial take off of off sourcing 
is no doubt greatly influenced by the resulting offshoring which reduces the factor prices for 
firms. The point is as offshoring develops the division of labour and specialisation which that 
drives could be  also quite significant in the efficiency gain. This is for instance true of 
software, where firms outsource specific software development since inhouse costs are 
increasingly prohibitive for even very large firms in comparison to specialist software  
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developers. Price of manpower is, even if important, a secondary issue today though the 
process of outsourcing may have been helped by offshoring software development. 
 
Non-Equity Forms too Are Important 
In brief, FDI and related arrangements such as non-equity forms (Joint ventures, OEM, 
international subcontracting (IS), brandname licensing, contract R&D) are all capable of 
playing vastly positive roles in recipient economies. How much is actually gained would 
depend upon host country macroeconomic policies (even more than FDI policies). Typically 
growth oriented policies that ensure stable macro economy, avoidance of asymmetry between 
domestic and foreign investors in their costs of capital, export orientation, avoidance of 
overvalued exchange rates, policies that encourage local value added, and exploit relatively 
idle and abundant resources, policies and governance that result in good living conditions in 
cities, special policies for export industries including export of services, are all influences on 
the mix of FDI, and its orientation. This has undoubtedly been the case in the East Asian 
economies. In Latin America the larger penetration of foreign capital
3 does not ensure large 
benefits from FDI. Therein costs, in terms of displaced domestic businesses, large dividend 
and royalty out payments, curbing of  local entrepreneurship, contraction and high inflation  
resulting from capital flight, have been very large. The solution today cannot be in terms of 
restrictions on foreign investment, even though for Latin America in the fifties and sixties 
this would have been the right solution. The correct approach would really be to get the 
macroeconomic, industrial, infrastructural and trade policies right to engender the highest 
possible growth that is also sustainable in a current account and fiscal sense. Then openness 
on direct investment ought to lead to maximisation of the benefits of FDI. 
 
TOWARDS CONCEPTUALISING THE REGIONAL DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
 
The determinants and effects of FDI across countries   are important issues for studies, 
especially those empirically, oriented.   But the regional distribution of FDI within a country, 
conditional on the total quantum into the country has hardly been empirically investigated. 
Conceptually too, the problem has not drawn much attention. Perforce therefore we have to 
start with constructs of our own.  
 
                                                 
3 This is actually a resulting perversity of inappropriate macro-policies that have 
discriminated against local accumulation, and favoured capital flight.  
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Structural Regional Decomposition 
The regional distribution of investment in general has attracted much discussion and various 
approaches are possible. One important thread of empirical analysis has been to decompose 
the difference between the growth (of investment, GDP, employment etc) of the region and 
the nation as a whole into a structural and  a ‘regional’ component. The structural component 
is essentially the growth difference that is accounted for by the differential rates of growth of 
industries, and the prior regional distribution of industries, That is given the regional 
distribution and the variations in growth across industries, the amount the region would have 
grown had each of its industries grown at the same rate as that of the nation of a whole is the 
structural component. The residual is interpreted as the difference that arises due to the 
favourable (or adverse) regional factors such as better infrastructure, cheaper and better 
availability of factors, lower risk, better governance, better access to central places, fiscal 
concessions etc. More correctly the residual is due to both regional and the interaction of the 
structural with the regional factors. The conceptual basis in the structural component is that 
industries have different growth rates and in the first instance all firms irrespective of location 
are expected to grow at the growth rates of their industries. Additionally agglomeration 
economies would lead to the expectation that new firms in a particular industry are expected 
to come up physically close to other firms in the same industries.    
 
Economic geographers have attempted to understand and relate development to geographical 
factors, prior agglomeration, urbanisation, transport network access and costs, besides 
specific natural resources. There is much that is empirical and in the nature of simulation in 
such studies, since the concepts are rather simple viz. the lower transactions cost of a location 
versus the cost of factors in the ideal location (usually close to prior agglomerations), and the 
cost of internalisation versus that of markets, but still in close proximity in the region. 
 
Spatial Inequalities: Income and Industrial 
Another genre of studies have asked the question “what happens to regional inequalities 
during the process of transformation?”.  A fairly consistent answer (except when the state has 
played a very large role in locational decisions) obtained  was  that initially the inequality 
rises and then declines. In contrast the inequality in industrial investment has shown much 
variation.  And the inequality in industrial distribution has widened in most cases. This is 
because as some regions take off industrially, there is much regional migration of factors 
towards the region to attenuate the otherwise sharp rise in local costs, so that the  
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agglomeration economies have a larger run before the local costs rise sufficiently for 
industries to find new locations and clusters. Typically more than wage costs, it is rising land 
and infrastructural costs that drive industries to new locations.  In countries with  good 
municipal level governance, and with much autonomy at the local level to respond to the 
increased need of dynamic agglomerations by creating the physical infrastructure for 
industries, regional concentrations are very large and bring about transaction efficiency. Only 
the distribution of raw materials and geographical factors have acted to disperse industries. In 
other words, once they arise, clusters and centres have played dominant roles. This for 
instance is true of the US. The pattern of concentration in the North-east and Mid-West 
reduced the transactions cost much.  Such costs would otherwise have been high if industries 
were more dispersed regionally. 
 
Role of Central Places in Spatial Aspect of Investment 
In countries with much less autonomy at the local level to respond to the infrastructural 
needs, dynamism of the centres have been muted, by the infrastructural shortages and 
limitations which quickly emerge and get reflected in the higher price of land to limit the life 
and size of emergent centres. When such infrastructural limitations are coupled with other 
policies that seek to disperse industries, then the denial of agglomeration economies and 
lower transaction costs besides scale economies in supportive activities such as infrastructural 
developments are large, and inefficiency and otherwise avoidable costs arise to make 
economies much less competitive than otherwise. This for instance has been the case in India 
where older clusters such as Bombay, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Kanpur and Calcutta lost out to 
newer clusters in Baroda, Ranchi, Bangalore, Coimbatore, Pune and such middle order cities. 
In such economies the slower growth resulting from higher transactions cost imposed may 
actually have reduced the capacity of regional inequalities in the income sense to decline in 
the future. China since its open door policies is closer to the US in this regard. 
 
Geographers and students of urbanisation have drawn attention to the phenomenon of 
extreme metropolitan development that took place in the countries that were colonised to 
transform the port towns which emerged as concentrations of enclaved modern industrial and 
commercial activities. Thus in nearly all of Africa, much of Asia a single or a few towns – 
Mexico city, Buenos Aires, Calcutta, Karachi, Mumbai, Lagos,  etc emerged to command a 
vast hinterland with deep contacts with the metropolitan centres in Europe. Such cities served 
as conduits for colonial trade, importing manufactures and exporting raw materials and semi  
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finished goods, and carrying on the associated trade and industrial activities. There was little 
urban development outside such metropolises, so that instead of having the much more 
functional rank size pattern typical in independent countries that successfully industrialised 
(Europe and the US), the urban space was dominated by one large city. In larger countries 
like India there would have been several such cities, only weakly linked and interacting with 
each other. 
 
Movements Away from the Colonial Economy 
The colonial economy created such urban systems and they in turn maintained the colonial 
economy. With independence and a rush towards industrialisation, under import substitution 
policies, and with planning, such patterns were sought to be changed. But success depended 
not so much on the various regional development or urbanisation policies but on the success 
with regard to industrialisation. Thus countries like India with better success than those in 
Latin America or Africa have been able to move quickly to the rank size pattern of 
distribution of cities. It is only in eastern India which had had much slower growth than the 
rest that the extreme dominance of Calcutta has persisted. It is not that Calcutta has grown 
faster than other metros. As the urban pattern has rapidly moved to the rank size rule, the 
middle and lower order cities have emerged to grow very rapidly and the post independence 
period was marked by the emergence of new industrial centres. Policies that sought to retain 
economic surpluses locally and bring about industrialisation would have naturally resulted in 
the middle order cities growing more rapidly as the economy integrated with greater internal 
articulation. But the process was furthered by direct measures of regional dispersal, a national 
level planning and execution of infrastructure and public investments, and administrative 
control over location of private investments through the policy of the industrial estates, and 
the central control of public sector investments. The overall dispersal and the below critical 
sizes of the clusters that this may have resulted in, as also the cost of inconvenient locations 
including distance from urban centres may have been quite high. 
 
With a more liberal set of policies emerging in the nineties, the larger centres and 
agglomerations and especially with a significant and dynamic industrial base would have 
been in an advantageous position to attract new investment. When such areas were close to 
major urban central places, which were also better served with infrastructure, and other softer 
city serving functions, these regions were able to grow very rapidly. Thus a state or regional 
economy without the metropole, but which during such transition, was able to create a  
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sufficiently large urban centre within  its boundaries,  would have been more successful in 
attracting investments which had locational discretion,  Later under liberal polices. Other 
investments with much natural resource linkage or dependent greatly on a particular 
geographical factor would have gone to specific locations despite even somewhat adverse 
factors. 
 
Unfettered Locational Choices Today 
Public investments especially in the manufacturing sector have declined in the Indian 
economy to be replaced by private investments. Much of the increase in the share of private 
investments happened in the late eighties and continued into the nineties till about 1997-98 
during which period private investments grew vary rapidly. While in the early part of this 
period perhaps till the close of the eighties, some private investors may have made their 
locational choices out of fiscal considerations (sales tax exemptions) increasingly and more 
so during the nineties, they would have been driven by economic and risk factors. Thus states 
with poor governance even when economic factors were not particularly adverse could have 
been given the go-by. Examples would be Kerala and West Bengal. 
 
Thus a worthwhile approach to the problem of regional distribution of FDI would be to 
consider FDI as merely a form of investments and to presume that the factors that underlie 
the distribution of investments in general would also underlie that of FDI. This to a large 
measure is correct, and no doubt useful. But regional science and location theory can be more 
fruitfully applied to the FDI question if the special characteristics of FDI are recognised.  
 
Intra Firm Distribution of Decision Making 
An interesting starting point is Stephen Hymer’s (1971) understanding of the location of 
activities within the globally present multinational corporation. Hymer following the early 
business strategy approach classified decision making into three kinds: operational, 
managerial and strategic. This classification has now become standard in the study of 
organisations and their strategy/ structure/ decision making. Strategic decisions where much 
discretion and value arises are housed in the head quarters (HQ) of the firm which for various 
organisational and economic reasons (span of control, availability of a wide variety of 
services locally, the possibility of being in close communication with other managerial 
hierarchies, the lower costs of a central place to direct and manage businesses from) tends to 
get located in the primate city of the source country. And source countries are those with  
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primate cities in the global sense. (And the rise of MNCs in a particular country strongly 
catapults its primate city to a higher level in a global sense). While some of the administrative 
/ managerial decisions could take place at the subsidiary level, they locate in the second order 
cities of the world which include the leading primate cities of the non-industrialised 
countries. The operational decisions covering the the day to day aspect of production could 
be located in many more central places, and therefore could be more widespread in a spatial 
sense. Thus an important insight which was crucial to  regional scientists – the hierarchy of 
central places, and the varying central place needs of various industries /activities, can be 
exploited to understand the regional choices of FDI firms or MNCs. The HQ functions of the  
MNCs having the highest need, and MNCs activities in other countries competing with the 
national firms of host countries for locating their offices for strategic decision making, would 
tend to successfully locate close to the most important cities. In other words MNCs need for 
central places is even larger than that of non-MNC firms, ceterius paribus.  This is easily 
related to the ‘intangible asset’ theory of MNC or the ‘advantage theory’ (Kindleberger, 
1969) which conceptualises that MNCs need to have an advantage (ownership) that is not 
easily traded in the market, so that they need to internalise the same to exploit their 
ownership advantages globally and they do so in countries with the best locational factors. 
This is the ownership, location, internalisation (OLI) framework, which is the mainstream 
conceptualisation of FDI/ MNCs. (Dunning, J., 1979)  
 
The Locational Choices of MNCs 
The MNC needs to have a distinct advantage so that it can overcome the intrinsic 
disadvantage of operating at a distance in a country that is different from its home country. 
Focussing first on the additional cost to the MNC in operating in a foreign country, it is 
obvious that risks especially those that arise out of political changes and uncertainties in the 
law in business, threatening events like riots and revolutions, discretionary rules, and 
regulatory uncertainties when they are large become asymmetric as between MNCs and local 
firms. This in an intercountry context implies that MNCs could bypass countries with large 
risks in spite of possibly good economic factors. In the intracountry context (especially in a 
large federally constituted nation) this means that regions that show adverse political and 
social characteristics would be severely punished by foreign direct investors.  
 
Lower order cities are more distant from foreign cities and home country central places on 
the aspect of living spaces, and availability of goods and services of a wide variety, as  
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compared to the largest primate cities of the host developing country. Thus lower order cities 
would have a comparative disadvantage to house FDI vis-à-vis domestic investments, so that 
FDI would be far more concentrated in the highest order cities. 
 
MNCs operate at the national and international (as when they export) levels, and hardly ever 
at the regional levels.  This means that their need for central places and ability to afford the 
same is comparatively higher for them than for nationally limited and certainly regionally 
limited businesses of similar products and sizes. This larger comparative need is perhaps the 
biggest driver of MNCs towards the primate and most well served cities in an economy to 
locate their (host country) HQ and offices. And then locating the actual plant /producing 
offices etc would be conditional on this choice especially when the outputs planned are not 
constrained by dependence on geography (natural resources etc).  In other words FDI would 
rank highest in the hierarchy of investments. The lowest ranking would be investments by 
small local firms and investments without scale and scope economies and with large costs of 
movement of good and services –typically retailing, vegetable sales, repair services etc. If the 
actual production is not characterised by a need to be near a particular resource or near 
markets, then it would be concentrated in the outskirts of the city selected for HQ, or in 
nearby smaller towns. If on the other hand the investments need to be near particular 
resources, then that factor would dominate the locational choice and the MNC may make do 
with the most central city or the city with the best serving functions near the resource. When 
production needs to be closer to markets (e.g. retail chain stores, oil distribution, food 
chains), then the investments would be distributed across the country with the HQ being 
located in the primate /best city. In the special case  where the activities of skilled people 
constitute the bulk of the value added (software, R&D, biotechnology, IT, telecom and 
electronics equipment, precision machinery) besides central place functions, good living 
conditions and spaces- city serving functions- would predominate. And in all cases there 
would be additional bandwagon effects following from the agglomeration economies. These 
are very large in service industries of the IT and software type. 
 
Intangible Assets and Central Place Requirements 
Now FDI presumably having a comparative advantage in intangible asset industries would 
tend to operate at national and international levels, in order to maximise the gain from 
intangible assets. since there are no diseconomies to reputational assets such as brands, 
technology, skills and trade secrets. Indeed the very reason for transnationalisation of MNCs  
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is to exploit the largest possible markets through internalisation (since markets for such 
intangible assets either don’t exist, or undervalue such assets). Thus given the prior 
transnationalisation of MNCs we would be almost never be wrong in presuming that MNC in 
the host country starts with the intention of accessing the entire national market.
4 
 
Countries have differed in the mix of FDI that they have attracted due to various reasons that 
include the differences in their endowments, their relationship with advanced countries such 
as a common market arrangement, and in their macro economic policies. The pattern of FDI 
as mentioned earlier then has in a large measure determined the contribution of FDI to the 
economy. 
 
Expected Archetypes of FDI 
The pattern also has implications for the expected regional distribution of FDI. Thus in 
resources rich countries which are also open to FDI, it is quite natural to expect a large part of 
FDI to be resource seeking, and therefore for the investments to be located where the 
resources are. When such countries are also pursuing export led growth policies (Malaysia) 
then labour seeking FDI and export oriented FDI would also be large, and also MNCs 
activities arising from non-equity arrangements such as OEM, IS, JVs, etc. In such countries 
FDI is likely to be very large both absolutely and relative to the size of the economy, though 
the latter type may still be modest in relation to the rapid growth that follows from the pursuit 
of export led growth. 
 
In contrast resources rich countries, with liberal FDI policies, also following either laissez 
faire policies or even ‘vanilla’ import substitution would have MNCs almost entirely in 
resource extraction, related banking trade and finance. Manufacturing investments would 
then be home market oriented and limited by the size of the market, and would be large in the 
industries that use intangible assets, and are oligopolistic, confining local firms to lowly 
profitable and competitive industries. Here MNCs would have wide presence and much 
dispersal.  FDI is large relative to the size of the economy.  
 
                                                 
4 This may not be true for MNCs from small countries in an enormously large market like the 
US, where MNC firms may chose a niche strategy. But there are very few cases where the 
niche strategy would translate into a local market strategy. More typically it would mean a 
niche product or service for the national market as a whole.  
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In countries with poor resource endowments relative to the population, and successfully 
pursuing export led policies, the growth rates would be high. While little or no FDI of the 
resource seeking variety would happen, the FDI in such economies, as also the non-equity 
arrangements too would be oriented towards global markets. But export orientation also 
means that there is no bias against domestic capital
5 (If any there is a small bias in its favour). 
Therefore in relation to capital formation in such economies FDI plays a relatively small role. 
But its spillovers effects can be large, and these may also be realised through non-equity 
forms. When in the early phases of their industrialisation such economies have also pursued 
restrictive policies with regard to foreign capital to nurture the growth of a domestic capitalist 
class, then the role of FDI in such economies have been small. Examples are South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan. The same is true of China today if due account is taken of the ‘round-
tripping’ and ethnic Chinese origin of much of the reported inward ‘FDI’. In such countries 
which have not pursued policies restrictive to FDI (Hong Kong, Singapore) the FDI in 
relation to capital formation can be large, with much of it directed to export industries. 
 
In countries with poor resource endowments and pursuing import substitution policies that 
discriminated against exports, growth has been small. When such countries also pursued 
policies restrictive to FDI, the role of FDI in their economies have been very small (India is 
the archetypical example). The little FDI that such countries attracted have been inward 
oriented. With liberalisation FDI policies in these countries  the large inflows could rival 
those in the former group of countries. The orientation of FDI is less functional than in the 
export-led group of countries.
6 
 
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND FDI IN INDIA 
 
Foreign direct investments have been small relative to the total investments taking place in 
the economy. Indeed the role of foreign resources as such has never exceeded 22% of gross 
                                                 
5 This happens because the fischer-open is never large and positive in these countries. It is 
kept closer to zero, so that significant biases in favour of foreign capital are avoided. Export 
led growth policies necessarily mean undervalued exchange rates, upon which then there is 
upward pressure.  The pressure does not spent itself, so that the continuing undervaluation 
improves the growth rate of tradables goods production over those of non tradables.  This 
results in accelerated  deployment of under and unemployed labour resources. (Morris, S., 
1997) 
6 For a more detailed discussion on the relationship between growth policies and patterns of 
FDI see Basant, Rakesh and Morris, S. (2002).  
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capital formation in the economy. The highest levels were reached during the Mahalanobis 
Plans (2
nd and 3
rd Plan Periods) during which the economy greatly diversified and industrially 
grew at very high rates.  The principal sources were then, official gaps and aid and 
multilateral credit. The large requirements of foreign resources, and technology were the 
important determinants. Even then FDI was sought to be kept at the minimum possible to 
access the technology and the complimentary factors that would not otherwise be available 
without equity investment. The principal mode of foreign technology imports was through 
licensing and bargaining hard for the same through restrictive policies. And a case by case 
approach dominated. The setting up of the public sector was inter alia motivated by the desire 
to obtain technology without going through the equity route, by creating high bargaining 
strength within the economy. In these respects the policy was not fundamentally different 
from that of South Korea, Japan
7 or Taiwan. 
 
The period of stagnation that followed the collapse of the Plan in 1964 till the end of the 
seventies was one of anomie. Restrictions continued and had perhaps become more severe 
with the institution of the Foreign Exchange and Regulating Act (FERA) in 1973. But the 
poor growth of the economy meant that even more than restrictions the demand constraint 
may have operated to keep FDI low and possibly negative. Indeed during this period Indian 
capital itself being subject to growth and market constraints, invested on a substantial scale in 
other developing countries. (Morris, S., 1988) 
 
In the eighties period of revival and high growth, the restrictions continued, but higher 
growth (industrial growth of the order of 8%) ensured a sufficient impetus for both “foreign 
technical collaborations” (pure technology imports) and “financial cum technical 
collaborations” (foreign direct investments) to increase in a big way, especially in 
comparison to the past. But the flows were really small in relation to the inward flows to 
economies growing at similar rates.  
 
The Reform Period 
The major liberalisation of the economy in the nineties was a turning point in the growth of 
FDI into the country. The success of the stabilisation put through in 1991-92 was followed by 
major structural reform of the economy. In a series of announcements FDI was allowed in a 
                                                 
7  In both Japan & South Korea, the Zaibatsu/Kieretsu, and the Chaebol respectively played 
that role of presenting a unified front to foreign capital.   
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large variety of industries. In 1995 there was further reform when an even larger set of 
industries was announced and majority stakes allowed in even more. Further announcements 
have all but opened up the entire economy. Few areas exist where majority stakes are not 
allowed (airline, insurance, real estate, media retail trade and a few others). The simultaneous 
‘cold’ privatisation of sectors hitherto reserved for the public sector, including much of 
infrastructure and nearly all of manufacturing to private participation automatically opened 
the same to foreign capital and lent substance to the liberalisation in FDI policies. All of these 
would have meant little if the economy had not grown substantially. The Indian economy 
unlike many others going through stabilisation and reform, recovered quickly with large 
growth in private investment. FDI increased greatly since there were strong bandwagon 
effects and India was expected to be a second China with a vast middle class. A part of such 
expectations was hype, since Indian policy makers were not reorienting the economy as an 
export led growth economy but only as a laissez faire one. But the high growth especially in 
exports that followed at 20% in dollar terms for four years in a row was signal enough for all 
but the most conservative investors. The rise in exports was the result of a fallout, of the 
correction of the severe biases against Indian exports that had been a feature of economy 
from almost the start of the plans.  The depreciation of the currency by real 25% over 1991-
92 and 1992-93 worked better than expected (Morris, S., 1997). The currency then 
appreciated from the values immediately following the stabilisation and since the same was 
left uncorrected, the growth rate of exports came down much before the East Asian currency 
crisis. With that crisis exports collapsed, and the economy entered into a recession (slower 
growth at 5%) with industrial growth about a percent lower. The recession which continued 
from 1998 till 2001-02, has now revived due to the spending effects of the Golden 
Quadrilateral (GQ).  And the good monsoon this year has further strengthened the recovery. 
The non-appreciating rupee especially in a weighted sense, since the dollar has been 
appreciating, has kept the growth rates of exports at a modest 12+% on the average. While 
growth has revived to reach 8+%, industrial growth rate remains sluggish at rates perhaps not 
in excess of 6% since the export thrust is weak and domestic demand especially on 
investment is weak. 
 
The economy was also opened to portfolio flows early on from 1992 itself and the quick 
stabilisation of the economy resulted in large portfolio investments into the economy along 
with direct investment flows. In less than a years’ time the key financial sector reform in the 
sense of allowing a market determination of the rate of interest was also put in place. These  
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changes were possible because the economy showed the strength in coming back to high 
growth despite the draconian cuts on public investments. Private investment which had been 
growing very rapidly since the late eighties continued to grow, at high enough rates to keep 
up the expenditure pressure on despite the fall in public investments. This happened till about 
1996-97 after which the lack of regulatory and policy clarity in many investment heavy 
sectors of infrastructure did not allow private investments to keep growing at the high rate 
that it had earlier (Morris, S., 1997). The high growth rate of private investment had taken 
place in a regime of high interest rates that followed the financial sector reform. The inflation 
rates till 1995 were high, but after that the inflation came down to under 6% and the real rates 
were high, and investments continued for another couple of years. This happened because of 
major regime shift in favour of private investments and strong demand side factors coming 
from higher growth rate of exports and a somewhat better performance of agriculture – up to 
3.4% on an n average from its 3.2 % growth in the eighties.  
 
Rise of Capital Inflows and the Cost of Capital 
With vast capital inflows and market determination of interest rates, the situation had become 
complex for the conduct of macroeconomic policies. Until the inflation levels had been 
brought under control, it made sense to carry out monetary targeting with partial sterilisation 
of capital inflows to ensure that the money supply did not deviate too far from the target on a 
trend basis. Once inflationary control had been achieved in 1996 the continuance of monetary 
targeting rather than interest rate targeting meant that real interest rates continued to remain 
high (till very recently), and domestic credit had to contract any time there was “excess” 
capital inflows. This pressure on domestic credit intermittently has continued to this day to 
hurt domestic industry, and create a bias in favour of foreign capital in investing in India, 
arising out of the fischer-open.  A more expansionary monetary policy and continued nominal 
depreciation of the currency (to prevent its real appreciation) would on the other hand have 
kept exports at very high rates even during the Asian crisis, and kept growth rates high. But 
this would have meant ‘disequilibrium’ pricing of the rupee – and in essence not allowing the 
capital flows to affect the rupee value. The fear that such expansionary and aggressive 
exchange rate policies would provoke inflation is quite unwarranted. Firstly the response of 
the economy to use idle and partly used capacities (in response to such structural 
undervaluation) is very high (and is not realised by mainstream macroeconomists). Secondly 
inflation at rates below 8% or so is very much a reflection of the support prices for food and 
oil prices, both of which are either exogenous or administrative. Only at rates above 8% does  
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one have to worry about money supply. Moreover empirically the fact that growth tends to be 
very much an unsteady process means that monetary targeting has the danger of killing off a 
good run of growth, by restricting money supply or overvaluing the currency (Morris, 
S.,1997).   
 
Policy Contradictions and Conservatism 
Besides the fact that capital inflows have been in excess of the current account deficit, with 
much variation though, the matter of vast remittances inflow is serious enough. 
Conventionally there is no reason to not take into (credit) account these flows (unrequited 
transfers) of about US$12-14 billion annually. They allow for a larger trade deficit than 
otherwise possible and the RBI has been quite comfortable dealing with remittances this way. 
It means that the exchange rate then is misaligned (rupee is overvalued than otherwise) from 
the point of view of export growth, and growth in general. In other words interest rate 
targeting and a growth oriented monetary and exchange rate policy in a highly competitive 
like India or China necessarily means running vast BoP surpluses. This arises because high 
growth being export linked does not lead to current deficits in a big way so that even with 
growth greater than the rest of the world’s, the actual need for capital inflows are small, so 
that capital inflows lead to the reserves going up. This is also another way of saying that these 
economies have no savings constraint, with savings being able to follow investments as and 
when they rise with a lag. The Chinese policies in ensuring high investment results in savings 
rate in excess of 40% and close to the marginal. India has a marginal savings rate that is close 
to 35% while the average is still below 28%, underlining the vast scope for investment led 
high growth if more aggressive exchange and monetary policies can come. Conservative 
monetary policies which continued ever since 1997-98 made it necessary for fiscal 
stimulation to lift the economy out of the slow growth of around 5%. This happened without 
much planning as the investments for the Golden Quadrilateral took place. The expenditure 
multiplier effects lifted up the economy, even in a year of significant decline in agricultural 
output (2003-03). The year 2003-04 saw a major rebound of agriculture with growth in 
excess of 7%, and this was an additional boost. Similarly export growth on the decline of the 
dollar, which saw the rupee marginally depreciating with respect to a basket of currencies 
(even as it appreciated vis-à-vis the dollar), besides revival of the world economy, were 
further positive factors acting through the expenditure multiplier route. But industry in 
general in contrast to certain industries relating to the construction industry, and consumer 
spending have not revived much. Industrial investment remains sluggish, and industrial  
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growth is under 7% most probably closer to 6.5% today. This is clearly dysfunctional to an 
economy. Even the eighties with all its structural imbalances saw a higher industrial growth. 
Earlier before the last two years and 1998-99 onwards it was much smaller closer to 4.5% on 
an average. Clearly an economy where even today barely 20 % of its people are involved in 
industry, compares unfavourably with other rapidly industrially economies where much 
larger proportions are gainfully employed in industry. ‘Poor’ industrial growth arising from 
conservative macroeconomic policies has been India’ most significant problem since 1997-
98. Apparently though over the last two to three years the RBI seems to have supported the 
impetus created by the fiscal thrust and good agriculture by keeping both M1 and M3 growth 
above the growth in nominal GDP and M1 growth above M3. How long this will continue, is 
the question, since the RBI could have made an exception for the run up to the elections, to 
only revert back to monetary conservatism. Variations in the growth rate of regions are 
expected to be much larger than that of the countries to which they belong and vary inversely 
with the size of the region, in contrast to the positive relationship between variations across 
countries’ GDP over time. (Robinson, E. A. G., (ed.) 1960). Gujarat has been most badly hurt 
by the slow down since 1997-78, reducing considerable the investments both domestic and 
foreign. 
 
THE NEW INDUSTRY IN GLOBALISATION 
 
The success of the IT industry in India and of key firms such as INFOSYS, WIPRO, TCS, 
MASTEK and others, and the emergence of some of them as global specialist firms providing 
a service that is in part tradable has been a most significant development for the economy. It 
has allowed for remote production of the more involved portions of the services, especially 
those related to IT. Exports of software have grown at rates in excess of 50% per annum and 
have been generally immune from the vagaries of the exchange rate.  The comparative and 
competitive advantage of Indian firms has been very large. The large growth of these firms to 
become among the largest in the Indian economy, and with a large share of their output being 
directed globally, has lead to many spillovers and positive feed back effects on the economy.  
These have included the spawning of a large educational system for IT and software related 
skills, and the emergence of a large IT oriented cluster in Bangalore.  The interest of other 
global leaders of software production, computing and networking firms to come to India to 
seek skilled labour has been stoked.  This can take place potentially on a scale larger than the 
movement of electronic and hardware firms to Singapore and South Korea in the sixties and  
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seventies to seek semi skilled labour. As Bangalore has developed as a cluster with the local 
availability of other city serving functions, global firms have been emboldened to shift largish 
operations to the country. Besides the cheapness of Indian programmers, the fact that so 
many high IQ and young people are willing to do the long hours that go into software 
production, and of course English language familiarity have been important in the use of 
Indian professionals and skilled workers globally but especially in the US. That phenomenon 
has gone beyond IT to areas like management consultancy, financial operations and 
consultancy, biotechnology, R&D in many scientific areas but especially in areas which are 
scientists and technologists intensive – drugs testing and development, fine chemicals etc., 
though the numbers involved are small in relation to IT and related industries. In an ultimate 
sense the comparative advantage of the country lies in several basic tendencies that are 
important to understand: (1) The large expansion of technical education well above the 
capacity of the economy to absorb them since Indian growth has been small in relation to 
East Asia and has additionally been not of a labour absorbing variety. (2) The cultural 
preferences that sees education as more than a means to higher incomes, which is rooted in 
the brahamanical tradition and which other groups have been imitative of, given the strong 
sociological process of sanskritisation even as westernisation takes place. (3) India very early 
on showed the largest proportion of young people in the college going age in college, among 
all LDCs.  And when adjusted for its low per capita income this preference was very large 
indeed. (4) The labour market for blue collar workers is sharply fragmented. A hoary history 
of labour movements and political action by unions and key labour protective legislations, 
have enhanced the power of organised blue collar workers.  So Indian industry in comparison 
to East Asian industries faces a severe handicap of little labour flexibility, very high cost
8, 
and poor managerial control to be able to deploy blue collar labour flexibly.  The extremely 
low cost of unorganised sector workers can hardly be used directly by the larger corporate 
sector since that would overnight unionise them such being the law of the land. The only 
possible use of such labour is by the small sector which by remaining small is able to 
maintain this advantage arising out of access to the pool. This situation severely limits the use 
of labour in large and modern industries, so that (over and above the macro policy biases) 
there is a structural bias against industrial absorption
9.  
                                                 
8Relative to the unorganised sector and skill and working hours adjusted the difference can be 
as high 8:1. See for instance Joshi and Joshi (1976). 
9 Export led growth has the potential to break this constraint through accelerated vendor 
development. See Morris, S., et al (2001).  
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White Collar Worker and the Political Economy of Service Industries 
In contrast white collar workers do not consider themselves as workers but as ‘bhadralok’ or 
‘officers’ or ‘coordinators’ or ‘assistants’, and middle class people, and the ethos that sees 
paper work as inherently superior to work with one’s hands helps to maintain a sharp division 
and separation between blue and white collar workers. All these have allowed managers to 
deploy skilled white collar workers productively in almost all segments of economic activity 
(except perhaps in the government and in certain public sector undertakings (PSUs) which 
are burdened with massive over manning). The cost of production of such workers (education 
and skills imparting) being a white collar activity is itself very cheap so that there has been a 
great capacity of the Indian economy to produce white collar workers of all types and for 
them to be used globally. The education and training industry (besides the usual on the job 
training that takes place in the firm) ranges form the most sophisticated often initiated by 
state support early on in the developmental process (like the IITs, the Maritime Training 
Colleges), and large global private industries, little more than garage and home based 
operations that pre-skill young people into computer literacy. Thus a range of offshore 
activities that utilise this cheap and skilled labour has been coming up in India. Custom built 
software is the key force of Indian firms. This is because Indian firms not being in the 
advanced countries, and lacking the linkages have not been able to get into the business of 
standardised and branded software, MNCs that range from Microsoft to Motorola too have 
significant operations in India to develop software that is entirely internal to the firm. The 
export of such software is implicit since it takes the form of wage earnings of the people 
working in these firms, and the output is not (and cannot be) recognised as a distinct service 
or product. Such operations could involve the software related aspects of very high tech R&D 
such as the software for chip design optimisation and HDTV controller management 
(SASKEN, earlier Silicon Automation Systems, Motorola), to even mundane operations as 
for instance in writing code for telecom switches or drivers for any number of devices for 
computers. More generally the lower end of the skill scale –data entry operations, scanning, 
answering telephones, data processing, plain and simple typing i.e. the output of semi-skilled 
workers portends to take off with the increased tradability of services especially those that 
have a bearing on (or one aspect in) information. 
 
“Off-shoring” and Off sourcing  
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Since in all these cases the important revenue leg is inevitably in the advanced capitalist 
countries the advantage of the foreign firm is very large. But for this potential to be realised 
the pioneering work by Indian firms who proved and demonstrated the first archetypical 
cases of “off shoring” was important. But with a few MNCs in IT having located activities in 
India and even other MNCs not necessarily in IT doing similar things, the  example has been 
set, at least for the larger MNCs who are able to scale up sufficiently, to overcome the initial 
indivisible cost of operating in an unfamiliar environment. For smaller firms in the advanced 
countries (and many services are dominated by smaller firms) the shift to Indian creation and 
offshoring more generally would have to await some further development as the right local 
services and infrastructure, and systematic governance, fewer and quicker contact points of 
dealings with authorities, or markets for the same in the form of facilities providers, emerge. 
In any case the role of foreign based firms is most important in the development of 
offshoring. This is not to deny the continuing large role played by joint ventures and entirely 
Indian firms and subcontracting firms in the offshoring of services provision and operations. 
Thus both equity and non-equity forms would drive the growth in IT, and related sectors. 
What we have said about IT is to a large measure true of other services like BPO, back office 
operations, financial (back office) services, remote consultation, etc. Since these sectors have 
been among the most dynamic in India it is natural that a large number of FDI and related 
arrangements would be in the sector even if the values of equity share capital or physical 
investments involved are not large. But being labour using and having vast spillover effects 
their impact on the local economy is very large. 
 
A BRIEF CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE EXPERIENCE OF FDI INDIA 
Several things stand out in the discussion above on macroeconomic policies that bear on FDI 
and industrial growth. A close observation of the events in FDI and multinational activity 
would lead us to the following summary of the happenings: 
(1)  The policies have biased against exports (mfg) and industrial growth keeping both 
well below their potential. 
(2)  The high overall growth (still lover than East Asian levels) has been large enough to 
attract large capital inflows, including portfolio investments despite only one way 
convertibility. The inflows of all foreign capital put together are far larger than the resources 
gap which is most manageable at about 1 to 1.5 % of GDP and sometimes even less so that 
capital inflows add to reserves, and this condition cannot be managed without either greatly 
reducing the growth rates below the potential of the economy or closing the door to inflows.  
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(3)  The conduct of macroeconomic and exchange rate policy has been to keep alive in 
most periods a positive fischer-open that has created an advantage for MNCs over local firms 
ceterius paribus that arises due to the differences in capitalisation by MNCs and local firms 
(Aliber, 1970). This advantage even more than the ownership advantage has both driven the 
volume of FDI, and the increasing control of foreign equity investors through enhanced stake 
and takeovers. This factor has acted in combination with ownership advantage to result in the 
loss of control over businesses by local parties. (Rosario, S., 1998). The asymmetric cost of 
capital (the fischer open) has resulted in foreign direct investments in many industries more 
out the financial “weaknesses” assets of local capital rather than any intrinsic ownership on 
the part of foreign capital. This in a situation where the marginal savings rate has been in 
excess of the average savings rate has resulted in avoidable displacement of domestic 
investments by foreign capital. The large share of infrastructural investments especially those 
without any intangible assets is indicative. 
(4)  The local firms’ competitive strengths and barriers to entry have been around existing 
distribution chains and networks. These can at best be only temporary barriers, so that foreign 
capital that came in initially in partnership with local firms ended up setting up their own 
businesses once they learned and developed the local networks. They were also aided by the 
sequential relaxation in policy. As the reforms of 1995 and 1998 allowed many more sectors 
to have 75%+ foreign equity and 100% ownership, many more foreign investors ended up 
buying out their domestic partners. As the biases in the cost of capital has attenuated after 
2000-01, domestic businesses buying out foreign interests especially in infrastructure and 
such other areas where the foreign owner did not have any particular ownership advantage 
was also seen. 
(5)  Mergers and acquisitions were an important route in the entry into Indian economy. 
(Basant, R., 1999) 
(6)  There would have been much reorientation in FDI with more of it going into export 
oriented industries, than before in the eighties, though because export led growth policies 
were not pursued, a complete changeover has not taken place. 
(7)  The correction of the severe biases against exports that ruled from the fifties to the 
end of the eighties has lead to a rapid rise in the orientation towards exports of the corporate 
sector (as also the import orientation). Foreign capital already operating in India and new 
investments, whenever they are in manufacturing and tradable products also show this trend, 
which unfortunately attenuated as the exchange rate appreciated.  
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(8)  Very large number of FDI Cases (with small amounts) and in related non-equity 
arrangements have been and would continue to emanate from the IT and related sectors and 
more generally services. For such activities, agglomeration economies exist and are 
significant.,  But even more than agglomeration economies, the city serving functions and 
central place functions, especially the former are perhaps crucial. Since the greatest 
dynamism is expected in these areas, this aspect and sector of FDI is likely to show the fastest 
possible growth. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FDI AND THE 
CASE OF GUJARAT 
 
The distribution of realised FDI over various states of India, is not publicly available.  Nor is 
the distribution of the resulting stocks available. What is available are the technical and 
financial (including technical cum financial) collaboration agreements that have been 
approved by the Reserve Bank and the Government of India (the Secretariat of Industrial 
Approvals (SIA)), from the SIA Newsletter. Since the SIA also makes available basic 
information on these approvals at a case level, the data base when linked to other databases 
such as of companies or industries of operation, the information therein can be useful for 
analysis. But they remain approval data rather than realised FDI. The actual realised 
investments data is published only country and industry wise. Since only about 30 to 40% of 
approval cases have actually been realised, the information is of limited use in studies that 
seek to delve deeper into the impact of FDI. For studies that are more concerned with the 
motivations and determinants of FDI though, they are relevant and may even be better than 
realised investments though of course realised investments have their own value
10. More than 
20,000 cases have been approved since the open door policy of 1991-92, and the list of 
projects approved is available on a monthly basis. These have been put together in the form 
of an electronic database by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) as part of 
their Business Beacon (BB) database. Much of the analysis in this study is based on the same 
project (case) wise information which was suitably modified, some residual errors removed, 
and extended then tabulated. 
 
                                                 
10 The author is in touch with the SIA and hopes that cases of realized investments data 
would be available, possibly as further entries to the approval data. Such a data base could go 
a long way towards understanding FDI and its impact on the country and in various states.  
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Table 1 brings out the net state domestic product of various important states and union 
territories and it shows that while Maharashtra had a share of between 16 and 17% of the 
gross domestic product of the country, its share of foreign direct investment as measured by 
the approvals is a whopping 46% as reflected in the total equity share capital in the cases 
approved for foreign equity participation since 1991.   There are the so called cases of 
(foreign financial cum technical collaborations) (FFCTC).  The next largest recipient Gujarat 
had a share of 15% or more in FDI while its GDP share was between 7 and 8%.  The next 
largest was by Delhi at 7.7%, whose share in GDP was only 3.7%. Other states with 
significant and large investments were Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamilnadu. In 
contrast many large states had very little investments, so that concentration of FDI in a few 
states is most apparent. The question arises about the determinants of FDI given percapita 
income and population since these are the obvious a priori determinants. Unfortunately with 
many states having close to no units or zero investments, the problem can be looked up in a 
metrical sense only for states with some investments. We use the moment use the total equity 
share capital in FFCTC rather than the foreign equity share. Thus  
 
Log(TE)  =A + b*Log (population) + c*(per capital income in 1993) 
 
About 50% of the variation is explained by this crude structural model. In terms of that model 
the ratio of the observed and fitted values of TE is as shown in Fig.1. Observe that clearly 
AP, Gujarat, Delhi, Goa, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamilnadu are most 
attractive for FDI if the adjustment for state size and per capita income are made. All these 
except AP, Gujarat and Karnataka are also rich states, so that the “competition” is really 
between these states. Bihar, HP, Kerala, Manipur Meghalaya, and UP are doing very badly 
and the others are kind of average.  
 
Gujarat in terms of this analysis gets far more TE than what is predicated by basic (structural) 
factors of size and income alone. Thus the first important conclusion that Gujarat is a major 
laggard in terms of foreign direct investments is not entirely true, when the FDI is measured 
by the total equity share capital rather than foreign equity. The total equity is more reflective 
of the project sizes and the direct investment impact (though not the spillovers). In terms of 
the FE measure Gujarat becomes a more normal state. It is only 4.4% when measured by FE 
against 8.2 % of total for the nation. See Table 4. This is because many minority share 
industries are part of the Gujarat set, and also possible because of financially stronger local  
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entrepreneurs who make possible a smaller share of the equity by the foreign partners. Both 
would have been effective though the data does not permit unravelling the relative strength of 
the two.  
 
That the industry structure may have much to do with this difference may be gleamed from 
the distribution of FDI (FE and TE) over the major groups, as seen in table 5 and also in table 
4.  The manufacturing sector dominates in Gujarat with as much as 86 % of the TE and only 
7.8 % in the services sector.  In contrast in the other states that have had much FDI, the role 
of the services sector is much larger (Delhi -60.6%, Karnataka 53% and Maharashtra 18.4%.  
In fact West Bengal is closer to Gujarat in this regard in having a much smaller (relatively) 
services sector. With the services sector showing a larger proportion of FE to TE, part of the 
difference between the TE and FE picture in the Gujarat case is explained. In other words the 
expected industry structure (given the mfg focus of the state) predisposes it to lesser FDI for 
the same quantum of investments. Additionally there would be further details of structure as 
well as the financial strength of local enterprise, as pointed out before, that could be factors. 
 
From Table 2 we see that the number of cases involved in Gujarat for the level of investment 
either (FE or TE) is far smaller in the case of Gujarat than for other competing states. In the 
case of Gujarat there were just 216 cases while AP, Delhi, Karnataka, Maharashtra and 
Tamilnadu had many more cases. This obviously implies the larger size of investment per 
case which is as expected given the focus of Gujarat on capital intensive and basic chemicals 
and petrochemical industries. More importantly the distinctly larger number of cases in other 
states arise largely out of services and other key industries which tend to be more fragmented 
– electronics, computers, auto ancillaries, food processing.  
 
With regard to the number of units,  these other states have a large lead over Gujarat. This is 
important since in a sense one large unit is not equal is to summation of several small units. 
In the context of spillovers and linkage effects which are known to be the main positive 
effects of FDI the numbers of units (cases proposed) are important. Similarly, it also means 
that many more decision makers and decision making units have found locations other than 
Gujarat and these states are more suitable. Is this another way of saying that Gujarat has 
specialised in larger, investment intensive with larger unit size industries? To a certain extent 
yes, but not entirely. Much of the difference arises on account of service industries including 
software and other lighter manufacturing which are runaway industries prima facie in the  
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sense that are not necessarily dependent upon natural resources though their dependence upon 
agglomeration economies could be large. Then the advantages seized earlier by these states 
can as it does have lasting effects acting through agglomeration and bandwagon effects. 
 
 
Table 3 brings out another important dimension in the location of FDI. When we classify the 
cases of FFCTCs into the functional city
11 near which or in which units are planned to be 
located, that there are very few cities involved in FDI is clear enough. Such information was 
available only for 6238 units out of all FFCTCs. The distribution reveals that at about 1% or 
more (going either by the no of cases or the total equity involved), only Ahmedabad, 
Bangalore, Calcutta, Chennai, Coimbatore, Goa (considering the entire state as a ‘city’), 
Hyderabad, Jamnagar
12, Kancheepuram. Mumbai, Pune, Raigarh (Pune) were the significant 
cities. In the case of Jamnagar, one unit made all the difference. Kancheepuram itself has to 
access the central place functions of Chennai. Besides the metros the other cities are among 
the most dynamic and with the best city serving functions especially Bangalore, Hyderabad 
and Pune. Ahmedabad known to be mediocre in this respect barely makes it. The lead of 
Bangalore, Hyderabad, and of even much smaller Pune over Ahmedabad is very large.,  And 
Delhi and Mumbai especially the latter with a phenomenal 42% of all investment, are in a 
class by themselves. Thus clearly the primate and central place driver in the location of FDI 
as discussed earlier is clearly seen.  FDI tends to concentrate in the largest
13 and best cities. 
                                                 
11 Herein rather than go by the administrative definitions of the city we go by the idea of 
urban agglomeration and the city to which the units would turn to for central place functions. 
Then Gurgaon, Faridabad and Gautam Buddha Nagar are as much Delhi as Delhi proper, and 
so would Thane be a part of the Mumbai metropolis. 
12 Among the cases here is one for a total equity of Rs. 33,355 crore (!) and a foreign equity 
of Rs. 5000 crore by an unnamed party based in Delhi, for a refinery. If this case is removed 
(it has obviously not been realized) then Gujarat instead of having Rs. 41,000 crore of TE 
would have a mere Rs. 7,500 crore which would place it in the league of MP, and at less than 
half the levels of TE in the states of Karnataka, AP Tamilnadu and Delhi.  The industrial 
recession since 1997-98 in India, from which Gujarat suffered heavily and the policy 
quagmire with regard to the petroleum sector may have been responsible for the non-
realisation of this large an investment. The fact that it was to be in Jamnagar is puzzling since 
it is difficult to imagine any party trying to locate a refinery in Jamanagar in the wake of the 
Reliance unit, there in 2001 (the year the case was approved). We cannot drop it either being 
a recently approved one.  
13 Population is less of a factor than purchasing power and the services available in which 
respect Mumbai and  Delhi, would tower over Chennai and Calcutta.  After Mumbai and 
Delhi, Bangalore would be next followed by Hyderabad and Calcutta. Kanpur and Lucknow 
are far smaller and less livable in this respect.   
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Another 17 cities housed FDI to the extent of 0.25% or more using either of the measures. 
Most other cities (including many that are not in the list) were almost entirely out of the 
picture. This is as is expected, given the higher need for central places on the part of FDI 
firms and their higher ability to pay for the rents. 
 
In order to answer the questions: “has Gujarat attracted less FDI than it should have? Or has 
it done as well as the states of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh?” we have to adjust for 
industry effects. In that process we will also be able to uncover the particular industries 
through which the difference in the performance of the competing states can be brought 
about. 
 
The database of about 21000 records was split into that for financial and technical 
collaborations (pure), and then each of the data sets was reduced by summing up the equity 
(TE and FE in the case of the financial collaborations set) for the same state and industry 
code, and creating a variable that equalled the number of cases over which the summation 
took place- the number of cases. This data set was then used for the regression. Firstly the 
variable “no of cases” was regressed on its expected determinants viz state domestic product 
as in 1993-94, the growth in SDP between the years 1996-97 and 1993-94 and industry 
dummies to control for industry effects. Table 6 reports the regression results. As much as 
25% of the variation could be explained by this simple model.
14 Similarly the foreign equity 
variable was regressed on the same variables, and the results reported in Table 7. As much as 
19% of the variation could be so accounted for. The estimated models were then used to 
compute the predicted values of the number of cases and the foreign equity for each of the 
industry groups for the state. The ratios of the actual to the predicted value for cases and 
foreign equity are reported in table, columns A and B respectively. And the industries where 
the ratio is higher than 1 are highlighted.  
 
For Gujarat, only in machinery, vehicles, chemicals and commercial complexes is it greater 
than one. These are the only industries where Gujarat has revealed a comparative advantage. 
In contrast the big three – Maharashtra, Tamilnadu and Delhi housing the three highest 
                                                 
14 More rigorously the recognition that the distributions are truncated with many states having 
close to zero values for many of the industries should have led to the inclusion of these data, 
and a more appropriate estimation procedure. This is planned in second stage of the study. 
Nevertheless we do not expect the conclusions to change.  
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ranked cities show their advantage in a variety of industries with preponderance for service 
industries. Karnataka is the real winner in FDI  with the state showing an advantage in 
chemicals, electronics, leather and footwear, machinery of various kinds, metal products, 
textiles, construction related activities, electricity, marine foods, granite, business consulting, 
computer software, financial services, real estate, trading and retailing and 
telecommunication. Andhra Pradesh is somewhat behind Karnataka in this regard, but it is 
still ahead of Gujarat in having many more industries with a distinct advantage. 
 
Next the  number of cases of the purely technical collaboration agreements were regressed on 
the immediate determining variables. The results are reported in table 9. As much as 34% of 
the variation is explained. The ratio of the observed to the predicted no of cases tells us the 
relative advantage of the state in a particular industry for enterprises going in for technical 
collaborations with foreign enterprise. This ratio is reported in table 10. It reveals that Andhra 
Pradesh and Gujarat had little or no advantage in service industries. Gujarat showed a ratio 
larger than one in no service industry.  Its advantage was confined to manufacturing in 
machinery and chemical industries.  Delhi, Maharashtra and Tamilnadu were far ahead of the 
others, and Karnataka again had locational advantages in many manufacturing and in the key 
service industry - computer software, and in floriculture for which the high Bangalore plateau 
provides a natural advantage.  West Bengal too had certain distinct advantages in metals and 
mineral industries. Thus even in the aspect of the non-equity forms (technical collaborations 
industries  which are nationally controlled) Gujarat’s advantages are limited to a few 
industries, as are of most areas other than those which house the metro cities and Bangalore. 




AN EXPLANATION OF THE TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
 
The explanation of the story really lies in the growth performance of the Indian economy and 
Gujarat’s functional role in the same. As said before the relative decline in manufacturing in 
GDP (slowing down of manufacturing in relation to the growth of the services sector) has 
                                                 
15 The analysis and conclusions here would be confirmed by looking at the data base of all 
industrial projects under implementation, of the CMIE which is a larger set than that 
approved by the SIA, and includes state controlled projects, and projects without any 
technical collaboration whatsoever.  
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taken place. This for Gujarat which has been the manufacturing and basic and intermediate 
industries power house, has been particularly severe after 1997-98. Thus industry which had 
been growing very rapidly, with much variation though, over the eighties and the high growth 
period since the structural reform and stabilisation, declined somewhat  after 1997-98, to 
growth rates: -11.3, 6.9, 9.0 and 3.0 % over the next four years.   And even the recovery over 
the last two years has been muted. This is a major industrial decline
16.  Net State Domestic 
Product (NSDP) growth has declined even more since agriculture has virtually collapsed. See 
table 11. Gujarat’s economy has shown very sharp variation over the post independence 
period. Unfortunately only data from the sixties is available. The rise of manufacturing (SMA 
in Fig. 4) and the faster growth especially of the chemical, petrochemical and basic drugs 
industries in India over the eighties has been marked by the very rapid growth of the Gujarat 
economy, which had begun a little after 1979 when the country as a whole turned away form 
the so called ‘hindu-pattern’. Rates as high as 14% had been achieved since then. (See figure 
2 for a plot of the symmetric year to year exponential growth rates). It also shows the sharp 
decline of all economic activity including agriculture (which showed the sharpest decline) 
since 1997-98 up to which it had grown rapidly. The de-trended values of the log of NSDP in 
various major sectors for the Gujarat economy in Figure 3 shows the growth over the entire 
period. The recovery had begun in the early eighties at extremely rapid rates but then 
collapsed after 1997-98. Figure 4 which brings out the index also shows the slowing down/ 
plateauing off since 1997-98 in industry and the large decline in agriculture (PAGR in Fig. 4) 
with only the services sector growing albeit at somewhat slower rates. Thus Gujarat 
illustrates the problem of the country in a more extreme fashion – the premature slowing 
down of the  manufacturing sector in the face of conservative macroeconomic policies. 
Gujarat has borne the brunt of the conservativeness of macro policies and policies that 
discriminate (or do not encourage) tradables goods production. Its agriculture too shows a 
continued decline which cannot happen unless there are strong supply side reasons. We 
suspect that the mess in the electricity sector may in part be responsible for the continued 
non-recovery
17 of the agriculture sector. Higher wages and the lack of immigration in rural 
areas from poorer states and the limited scope for yield improvements in the face of limited 
                                                 
16 State level macroeconomic data is not as reliable as national level GDP data, but the broad 
conclusions are not likely to change. The data may as yet, as more accurate information 
become available show a better recovery in Gujarat over the last two years, than what is 
believed –perhaps of the order of 10% or more, when national growth rates on industry have 
been about 6+ % over the last two years. 
17 Much would depend upon the recovery this year with a good monsoon.  
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water availability
18 may be responsible for the slow down of agriculture since it is a 
nationally competing activity. The larger issue is one of influencing macroeconomic policy to 
pick growth and export orientation over other objectives, and thus the actions may lie outside 
the ambit of the state government’s actions. 
 
The second set of explanations lie in the inability of Gujarat to create a city of the type and 
scale of Bangalore in terms of the functions served and to attract key service industry 
pioneers which could then have served as attractors for smaller firms to create agglomeration 
economies. Since in population Ahmedabad is not too small a city is inability to step up to a 
second order metropole is surprising and requires deeper understanding. Clearly besides the 
visible difference between Bangalore and Ahmedabad, while cities around Banglore  
(Mangalore. Mysore, Hubli, Dharwar, Coimbatore and Ernakulam) mediate through it with 
the larger national primate city of  Mumbai and its competitior –Chennai, Ahmedabad does 
not command either of Rajkot, Surat or Baroda, not to speak of Indore, Bhopal, Kota and 
others which are well within its vicinity. These are directly commanded by Mumbai and this 
difference may have been critically important to the limited evolution of central place 
functions in the city of Ahmedabad. Added to the same may have been the very poor city 
serving functions especially emanating from poor educational facilities both schooling and 
technical education in the city and more generally in the state. 
 
To check out these and other insights in the second stage a survey of potential and actual 
investors including foreign investors on the issue of the regional determinants is planned, 
which should allow the policy makers to make the relevant corrections, since action may lie 
more than in merely being an ‘industrial friendly’ state. 
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Table 1: SDP Share of Various States and Union Territories 
  SDP at Constant 1993-94 Prices  Share of State to Total (%) 
STATE  1993  1996  2000  1993  1996  2000 
AP  5786664  6880900  8477705  8.25  8.04  8.56 
ARU  87420  95804    0.12  0.11  0.00 
BIH  1514317  1648650  1850049  2.16  1.93  1.87 
ASS  2281198  2695960  3024856  3.25  3.15  3.05 
CHA  146785  202838  275648  0.21  0.24  0.28 
CTG  1417075  1541517    2.02  1.80   
DEL  2084053  2702042  3668514  2.97  3.16  3.70 
GOA  239668  311883  413239  0.34  0.36  0.42 
GUJ  4919429  6996568  7665735  7.01  8.17  7.74 
HAR  2213130  2709482  3292128  3.15  3.17  3.32 
HP  478268  595528  763527  0.68  0.70  0.77 
J&K  634268  732740  867982  0.90  0.86  0.88 
JHA  1619664  1704141    2.31  1.99   
KAR  4107905  5030247  6995128  5.85  5.88  7.06 
KER  2632602  3089003  3844430  3.75  3.61  3.88 
MP  3797098  4417012  4736898  5.41  5.16  4.78 
MAH  11331964  13750938  16707477  16.15  16.06  16.87 
MAN  130809  151873  205586  0.19  0.18  0.21 
MEG  151105  179579  234537  0.22  0.21  0.24 
NAG  137463  168735    0.20  0.20   
ORI  1821308  1915195  2261850  2.60  2.24  2.28 
PON  848  897  966  0.00  0.00  0.00 
PUN  21297  22539  24310  0.03  0.03  0.02 
RAJ  3296970  4475488  5065835  4.70  5.23  5.11 
TN  5748201  7043868  8911003  8.19  8.23  9.00 
TRI  177723  212319  289588  0.25  0.25  0.29 
UP  8045108  9768488  10884258  11.47  11.41  10.99 
WB  5342414  6556213  8592911  7.61  7.66  8.67 
Total for above 
states/Uts  70164754  85600447  99054160  100.00  100.00  100.00 
NB: Source EPW Research Foundation, Estimates of SDP, compiled from NAS, CSO 
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Table 2: Statewise Distribution of All Financial Collaboration 
Agreements, since 1991 (Total Proposed Equity) 
State  Nos.  Rs.cr.  Share in All Known 
Cases 




Not Known  6778  251860.37  -  - 
Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands 
1  18.94 
0.02  0.01 
Andhra Pradesh  506  16977.05  7.72  6.37 
Bihar  9  306.27  0.14  0.11 
Chandigarh  25  315.35  0.38  0.12 
Chattisgarh  9  474.98  0.14  0.18 
Daman and Diu  13  37.23  0.20  0.01 
Dadra and Nagar Haveli  8  42.15  0.12  0.02 
Delhi  1216  20512.39  18.55  7.70 
Goa  89  1448.75  1.36  0.54 
Gujarat  216  41701.26  3.29  15.65 
Haryana  122  2184.23  1.86  0.82 
Himachal Pradesh  9  62.97  0.14  0.02 
Jammu and Kashmir  1  3.00  0.02  0.00 
Jharland  10  73.32  0.15  0.03 
Karnataka  1054  18010.67  16.07  6.76 
Kerala  87  951.66  1.33  0.36 
Maharashtra  1704  122997.25  25.99  46.15 
Manipur  1  6.49  0.02  0.00 
Meghalaya  1  12.00  0.02  0.00 
Madhya Pradesh  56  6334.57  0.85  2.38 
Nagaland  1  4.50  0.02  0.00 
Orissa  27  2337.80  0.41  0.88 
Pondicherry  26  956.69  0.40  0.36 
Punjab  38  1119.05  0.58  0.42 
Rajasthan  67  3173.09  1.02  1.19 
Tamilnadu  858  18520.48  13.09  6.95 
Uttar Pradesh  206  3156.52  3.14  1.18 
Uttarachal  2  24.58  0.03  0.01 
West Bengal  195  4760.56  2.97  1.79 
Total  13335  518384.16  203.37  194.50 
TOTAL excl. Not 
Known  6557  266523.79  100.00  100.00 
For 8605 cases the total equity proposed was not known, and have been 
excluded from the analyses 
  
Sebastian Morris, Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad  39
Table 3: Functional City-wise Distribution of 
Total Equity Capital in Foreign Financial 
Collaborations since 1991 













Agra  1  n.a.  0.02  - 
Ahmadnagar  1  10.00  0.02  0.00 
Ahmedabad  77  2396.74  1.23  0.94 
Alappuzha  7  74.57  0.11  0.03 
Aligarh  2  293.19  0.03  0.12 
Allahabad  1  0.04  0.02  0.00 
Alwar  17  371.97  0.27  0.15 
Ambala  2  9.72  0.03  0.00 
Amritsar  2  0.50  0.03  0.00 
Anand  2  0.98  0.03  0.00 
Anantapur  1  0.30  0.02  0.00 
Andaman  1  18.94  0.02  0.01 
Aurangabad(M
AH) 
18  612.47 
0.29  0.24 
Aurangabad 
(BIH) 
6  26.82 
0.10  0.01 
Baleshwar  2  3.63  0.03  0.00 
Banas Kantha  1  25.00  0.02  0.01 
Bangalore  989  14808.6
9 
15.8
5  5.81 
Bankura  1  0.27  0.02  0.00 
Barddhaman  3  208.41  0.05  0.08 
Bathinda  1  699.98  0.02  0.27 
Belgaum  2  25.11  0.03  0.01 
Bellary  5  514.40  0.08  0.20 
Berhampur  2  71.77  0.03  0.03 
Bharuch  16  815.74  0.26  0.32 
Bhavnagar  1  2.00  0.02  0.00 
Bhilwara  1  1.18  0.02  0.00 
Bhopal  10  64.16  0.16  0.03 
Bhuj  5  932.32  0.08  0.37 
Bilaspur(HP)  1  3.50  0.02  0.00 
Bulandshahr  1  0.07  0.02  0.00 
Calcutta  159  1250.87  2.55  0.49 
Chandigarh  25  315.35  0.40  0.12 
Chandrapur  13  1391.37  0.21  0.55 
Chennai  557  9358.80  8.93  3.67 
Chitradurga  1  11.77  0.02  0.00 
Chittoor  4  122.70  0.06  0.05 
Coimbatore  74  538.63  1.19  0.21 
Cuddalore  6  1923.66  0.10  0.75 
Cuddapah  1  151.96  0.02  0.06 
Cuttack  3  1048.40  0.05  0.41 
D&NHaveli  8  42.15  0.13  0.02 
Dakshin 
Kannada 
10  585.44 
0.16  0.23 
Daman  13  37.23  0.21  0.01 
Dehradun  1  0.90  0.02  0.00 
Delhi  1460  24282.2
4 
23.4
0  9.53 
Dewas  1  1.94  0.02  0.00 
Dhar  11  124.79  0.18  0.05 
Dharmapuri  10  232.54  0.16  0.09 
Dharwad  1  0.75  0.02  0.00 
Dhaulpur  1  4.33  0.02  0.00 
Dhule  2  20.73  0.03  0.01 
Dindigul  7  12.66  0.11  0.00 
Durg  1  282.67  0.02  0.11 
East Nimar  1  167.69  0.02  0.07 
Ernakulam  22  307.31  0.35  0.12 
Erode  1  0.14  0.02  0.00 
Gadchiroli  1  0.04  0.02  0.00 
Garhwal  1  23.68  0.02  0.01 
Ghazipur  3  48.09  0.05  0.02 
Goa  89  1448.75  1.43  0.57 
Gulbarga  1  1.00  0.02  0.00 
Guna  1  381.59  0.02  0.15 
Guntur  4  23.47  0.06  0.01 
Gurdaspur  2  1.30  0.03  0.00 
Gwalior  5  96.75  0.08  0.04 
HP  2  1.42  0.03  0.00 
Hardoi  1  3.75  0.02  0.00 
Hassan  2  15.99  0.03  0.01 
Hoshiarpur  2  150.00  0.03  0.06 
Hyderabad  403  7946.94  6.46  3.12 
Indore  10  295.40  0.16  0.12 
J&K  1  3.00  0.02  0.00 
Jaipur  21  788.99  0.34  0.31 
Jaisalmer  2  6.30  0.03  0.00 
Jalandhar  4  6.40  0.06  0.00 
Jalgaon  6  70.81  0.10  0.03 
Jalpaiguri  1  2.00  0.02  0.00 
Jamnagar  5  34292.0
1  0.08  13.46 
Jamshedpur  6  39.23  0.10  0.02 
Jhabua  1  340.14  0.02  0.13 
Jhansi  1  0.61  0.02  0.00 
Jodhpur  6  1131.68  0.10  0.44 
Kakinada  13  2980.70  0.21  1.17 
Kancheepuram  64  2990.22  1.03  1.17 
Kannur  2  10.04  0.03  0.00 
Kanpur  4  4.54  0.06  0.00 
Karaikal  3  120.50  0.05  0.05 
KochBihar  1  0.24  0.02  0.00 
Kolar  4  9.08  0.06  0.00 
Kolhapur  4  32.45  0.06  0.01 
Korba  3  3234.00  0.05  1.27 
Kota  4  241.95  0.06  0.09 
Kottayam  4  277.88  0.06  0.11 
Krishna  6  425.30  0.10  0.17  
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Kullu  1  0.48  0.02  0.00 
Kurnool  1  70.93  0.02  0.03 
Latur  2  18.00  0.03  0.01 
Lucknow  5  7.96  0.08  0.00 
Ludhiana  2  10.83  0.03  0.00 
Madurai  14  55.48  0.22  0.02 
Mahbubnagar  2  7.84  0.03  0.00 
Mahesana  9  168.16  0.14  0.07 
Malappuram  2  4.90  0.03  0.00 
Mandya  1  1.54  0.02  0.00 
Manipur  1  6.49  0.02  0.00 
Medak  1  8.90  0.02  0.00 
Medinipur  6  2252.76  0.10  0.88 
Meerut  3  1.52  0.05  0.00 
Meghalaya  1  12.00  0.02  0.00 
Moradabad  3  129.61  0.05  0.05 
Mumbai  1246  107524.
97 
19.9
7  42.20 
Mysore  14  103.46  0.22  0.04 
Nadia  5  63.72  0.08  0.03 
Nagaland  1  4.50  0.02  0.00 
Nagaur  1  0.59  0.02  0.00 
Nagpur  11  144.97  0.18  0.06 
Nalgonda  5  60.90  0.08  0.02 
Narsimhapur  2  279.06  0.03  0.11 
Nashik  21  69.73  0.34  0.03 
Nellore  4  196.77  0.06  0.08 
Palakkad  3  10.84  0.05  0.00 
Panipat  2  27.10  0.03  0.01 
Pathanamthitt  4  62.25  0.06  0.02 
Patiala  13  109.59  0.21  0.04 
Patna  1  0.34  0.02  0.00 
Pondicherry  26  956.69  0.42  0.38 
Pudukkottai  1  10.00  0.02  0.00 
Pune  294  5388.21  4.71  2.11 
Puri  10  121.28  0.16  0.05 
Rae Bareli  2  6.00  0.03  0.00 
Raigarh(CTG)  3  42.75  0.05  0.02 
Raigarh(MAH)  29  4920.60  0.46  1.93 
Raipur  5  149.56  0.08  0.06 
Rajkot  5  665.47  0.08  0.26 
Ranchi  2  32.68  0.03  0.01 
Ratlam  3  358.00  0.05  0.14 
Ratnagiri  5  1752.01  0.08  0.69 
Rohtak  3  9.90  0.05  0.00 
Sagar  3  1595.56  0.05  0.63 
Saharanpur  2  10.50  0.03  0.00 
Salem  2  0.65  0.03  0.00 
Sangli  1  2.00  0.02  0.00 
Satara  4  22.14  0.06  0.01 
Satna  2  129.40  0.03  0.05 
Shahdol  1  0.48  0.02  0.00 
Shimla  2  18.00  0.03  0.01 
Sirohi  1  356.60  0.02  0.14 
Solan  3  39.56  0.05  0.02 
Solapur  3  2.92  0.05  0.00 
Sonepat  2  7.80  0.03  0.00 
Srikakulam  2  31.14  0.03  0.01 
Sundargarh  3  371.27  0.05  0.15 
Surat  8  67.05  0.13  0.03 
Thanjavur  6  321.55  0.10  0.13 
Thiruvanantha  29  40.87  0.46  0.02 
Tiruchchirapp  3  100.79  0.05  0.04 
Tumkur  5  16.29  0.08  0.01 
Tuticorin  3  16.80  0.05  0.01 
Udaipur  4  27.45  0.06  0.01 
UttaraKannada  2  508.60  0.03  0.20 
Vadodara  53  1971.06  0.85  0.77 
Valsad  12  94.27  0.19  0.04 
Varanasi  4  15.77  0.06  0.01 
Vellore  2  6.82  0.03  0.00 
Virudhunagar  2  2.40  0.03  0.00 
Visakhapatnam  11  418.74  0.18  0.16 
Vizianagaram  1  12.17  0.02  0.00 
WB  19  982.31  0.30  0.39 
Wardha  1  3.19  0.02  0.00 
WestGodavari  1  121.31  0.02  0.05 




213  203 
Total excl. 
those for which 
location is not 




00  100.00 
NB: 8605 cases were excluded because they were 
purely technical collaborations or the equity amount 
was not known  
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Table 4: Distribution of Foreign Technical and Financial Collaborations Across States 
   Manufacturing  Electricity Gas and Water 
STATE  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O 
A&NI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  64.0  0.2 
AP  3.6  3.7  46.3  2.3  3.9  1.7  52.1  6.6 
BIH  0.1  0.0  21.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  29.5  0.3 
CHA  0.1  0.1  26.8  0.3  0.0  0.0  24.7  0.5 
CTG  0.1  0.1  51.8  0.4  0.4  0.3  45.0  0.2 
DEL  3.5  4.3  56.2  6.1  1.8  1.8  67.2  7.9 
GOA  0.6  0.6  43.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  75.5  0.3 
GUJ  19.0  7.7  47.0  2.5  2.1  2.5  57.8  2.1 
HAR  0.7  0.8  40.0  1.6  0.1  0.0  75.0  0.5 
HP  0.0  0.0  43.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  20.0  0.2 
J&K  0.0  0.0  13.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
JHA  0.0  0.0  46.9  0.1  0.0  0.0  60.0  0.2 
KAR  2.4  4.0  57.4  5.8  10.0  11.4  59.3  5.7 
KER  0.2  0.1  28.6  0.8  0.0  0.0  100.0  0.3 
MAH  8.0  10.7  52.2  11.4  1.7  2.2  55.6  7.3 
MAN  0.0  0.0  49.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MP  0.3  0.4  50.9  0.5  8.4  9.4  47.2  4.0 
NAG  0.0  0.0  81.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
ORI  0.4  0.2  39.3  0.2  1.6  2.2  100.0  0.3 
PON  0.5  0.9  42.8  0.3  0.1  0.1  63.0  0.2 
PUN  0.6  0.7  41.9  0.5  0.0  0.0  80.0  0.2 
RAJ  0.8  0.9  36.4  0.9  1.7  1.8  38.6  1.2 
TN  2.2  3.3  47.8  7.2  12.9  15.6  47.4  9.3 
UP  1.2  2.1  41.5  2.7  0.4  0.2  31.0  0.2 
UTT  0.0  0.0  8.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  90.0  0.2 
WB  1.7  2.3  51.6  1.7  0.9  0.7  62.9  1.2 
Unknown  54.0  56.9  51.0  53.6  53.8  50.0  66.9  50.9 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  
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Table 4 : Distribution of Foreign Technical and Financial Collaborations Across States (continued) 
   Extractive  Services  All sectors 
STATE  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O 
A&NI  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  64.0  0.0 
AP  0.2  9.8  38.3  2.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.9  2.0  52.7  1.5 
BIH  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  30.5  0.1 
CHA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  40.9  0.3  0.1  0.1  52.8  0.3 
CTG  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  44.5  0.2 
DEL  0.1  0.8  54.6  3.5  7.9  6.3  58.8  14.5  4.0  4.5  54.8  9.8 
GOA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1  70.6  0.8  0.3  0.3  46.1  0.7 
GUJ  0.9  2.4  28.8  1.5  2.1  2.3  38.0  1.6  8.2  4.4  26.6  2.1 
HAR  0.0  0.0  20.2  0.2  0.5  0.7  55.2  0.7  0.4  0.6  66.0  1.2 
HP  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  28.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  26.9  0.1 
J&K  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.3  0.0 
JHA  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  49.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  51.0  0.1 
KAR  0.1  0.4  55.8  2.1  4.1  7.1  70.4  11.9  3.5  6.6  92.0  8.3 
KER  0.0  0.4  29.5  1.2  0.3  0.3  41.4  1.4  0.2  0.2  54.3  1.0 
MAH  90.3  8.7  45.3  6.7  14.3  20.0  55.6  17.3  24.1  12.6  25.7  13.6 
MAN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  49.6  0.0 
   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MP  0.0  0.1  33.0  0.6  0.0  0.0  52.9  0.2  1.2  2.0  80.9  0.5 
NAG  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  81.8  0.0 
ORI  0.1  0.8  47.1  1.0  0.3  0.3  43.4  0.2  0.5  0.7  73.5  0.2 
PON  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  52.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  94.3  0.2 
PUN  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  41.0  0.1  0.2  0.3  59.3  0.3 
RAJ  0.2  0.7  51.2  0.6  0.2  0.1  62.5  0.3  0.6  0.8  61.2  0.6 
TN  0.2  2.5  38.4  6.0  3.4  3.5  55.7  8.2  3.6  5.8  78.9  7.7 
UP  0.0  0.1  56.4  1.2  0.3  0.2  58.9  1.0  0.6  0.9  74.2  1.8 
UTT  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  88.2  0.0 
WB  0.3  0.8  52.7  1.7  0.4  0.4  60.8  1.3  0.9  1.2  64.1  1.5 
Unknown  7.6  72.5  41.4  71.3  65.8  58.6  61.0  40.1  49.2  56.7  56.9  48.2 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0  100.0  100.0    100.0 
NB: T: Total Equity Share Capital in Financial Collaboration Units; F: Foreign Equity Share Capital in Financial Collaboration Units; S: Weighted Share of Foreign Equity 
in FCUs; O: number of cases in all technical and financial collaborations. The Cases pertain to the period from 1991 to the present. Data from CMIE, Business Beacon  
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Table 5: Distribution of Foreign Collaborations Approved Since 1991 Over State and Major Industry Division 
  Manufacturing  Electricity Gas and Water  Natural Resource Based  Services  All sectors 
STATE  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O  T  F  S  O 
A&NI          19  12  64  1                  19  12  64  1 
AP  6932  3596  46  171  2596  821  52  38  162  690  38  13          9690  5107  53  222 
BIH  276  35  21  5  25  57  30  2          0  0  0  1  302  92  31  8 
CHA  116  78  27  24  0  3  25  3          199  85  41  23  315  167  53  50 
CTG  272  119  52  32  283  127  45  1                  554  247  44  33 
DEL  6742  4111  56  452  1236  895  67  46  94  59  55  18  12397  6159  59  959  20468  11224  55  1475 
GOA  1090  531  43  47  0  0  76  2          358  136  71  54  1449  667  46  103 
GUJ  36228  7454  47  187  1381  1219  58  12  803  172  29  8  3268  2233  38  105  41680  11077  27  312 
HAR  1301  769  40  122  38  19  75  3  4  1  20  1  837  650  55  48  2180  1439  66  174 
HP  25  7  43  6  5  1  20  1          14  4  28  3  43  12  27  10 
J&K  3  0  13  1                          3  0  13  1 
JHA  41  18  47  8  32  19  60  1          0  0  49  1  73  37  51  10 
KAR  4679  3804  57  433  6690  5661  59  33  49  28  56  11  6506  6994  70  785  17925  16488  92  1262 
KER  388  143  29  59  0  0  100  2  39  27  30  6  482  323  41  90  909  493  54  157 
MAH  15212  10280  52  842  1140  1097  56  42  83908  616  45  35  22542  19615  56  1141  122801  31609  26  2060 
MAN  18  9  50  2                          18  9  50  2 
                                         
MP  653  404  51  38  5631  4697  47  23  25  5  33  3  15  8  53  10  6325  5114  81  74 
NAG  5  4  82  1                          5  4  82  1 
ORI  693  225  39  14  1091  1091  100  2  98  59  47  5  456  342  43  10  2338  1717  73  31 
PON  909  861  43  23  42  26  63  1          5  14  52  13  956  901  94  37 
PUN  1083  642  42  38  1  1  80  1          7  3  41  7  1091  647  59  46 
RAJ  1550  862  36  65  1144  899  39  7  192  46  51  3  274  127  63  19  3160  1934  61  94 
TN  4117  3181  48  536  8643  7779  47  54  228  177  38  31  5416  3390  56  539  18405  14528  79  1160 
UP  2292  2055  42  202  290  90  31  1  22  9  56  6  546  184  59  68  3150  2337  74  277 
UTT  1  0  8  5  24  21  90  1                  25  22  88  6 
WB  3214  2250  52  127  572  341  63  7  258  57  53  9  648  360  61  88  4692  3008  64  231 
Unk.  103209  54817  51  3971  36017  24860  67  295  7054  5132  41  371  103952  57524  61  2649  250233  142332  57  7286 
TOTAL  191051  96257  50  7411  66900  49738  74  579  92936  7076  8  520  157923  98152  62  6613  508810  251223  49  15123 
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Table 6: Results of Regression of No. of Cases of Financial and 
Technical cum Financial Collaborations in Each State Over SDP 
of the State in 1993 at Constant 1993-94 Prices, Growth in SDP 
and Industry Dummies 
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Sig.level 
Constant  -60.07045  -3.9942  0.0001 
SDP93  4.7273  5.2399  0.0000 
Log(SDP96/SDP93)  6.9945  0.3035  0.7617 
Industry Dummies (39)  -  -  - 
R
2 adjusted      0.1855 
R
2       0.2578 
No. of Obs.      473 




Table 7: Results of Regression of Value of Foreign Equity in 
Arising out of Financial and Technical cum Financial 
Collaborations in Each State Over SDP of the State in 1993 at 
Constant 1993-94 Prices, Growth in SDP and Industry Dummies 
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Sig.level 
Constant  -968.0644  -3.1393  0.0018 
SDP93  67.3152  3.6390  0.0003 
Log(SDP96/SDP93)  227.2013  0.4807  0.6309 
Industry Dummies (39)  -  -  - 
R
2 adjusted      0.1177 
R
2       0.1960 
No. of Obs.      473 
F-ratio      2.5022 
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Table 8: Ratio of Actual to Predicted Value of No of Cases, and of Foreign Equity Across Industry Groups for Certain States, based on All 
Cases of Financial and Financial Collaboration Cases since 1991 
Industry Descriptor  AP  DEL  GUJ  KAR  MAH  TN  WB 
  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
Manufacturing: Other, miscellaneous and 
unclassified 
0.41  0.06  2.72  0.68  0.55  0.04  1.80  0.46  2.57  0.67  2.06  0.93  0.86  0.62 
Manufacturing: Chemicals  1.34  3.26  1.96  0.54  1.47  6.51  1.90  0.50  4.96  2.14  2.15  1.08  0.78  2.12 
Manufacturing: Electronic equiments and related 
items 
0.81  0.82  2.96  2.04  0.32  0.15  2.00  1.68  2.92  1.35  1.61  0.38  0.49  0.55 
Manufacturing: Food processing and related 
activities 
1.21  1.69  2.36  2.89  0.43  0.10  2.31  2.58  1.53  1.54  1.58  0.48  0.19  0.06 
Manufacturing: Leather articles incl. footwear      0.29  0.01  0.12  0.04  0.48  3.39  0.18  0.02  1.40  0.40  1.06  0.04 
Manufacturing: Machinery of various kinds  0.63  0.38  2.49  3.62  1.13  0.59  2.23  1.42  4.51  1.78  2.67  1.30  0.56  0.25 
Manufacturing: Metals (aluminum)                  0.63  0.18        
Manufacturing: Non metallic minerals  0.28  0.31  2.86  5.09  0.40  0.05  0.71  0.02  0.97  0.80  1.39  1.32  0.29  0.21 
Manufacturing: other metal products  0.51  0.28  1.33  0.37  0.82  0.64  1.28  0.88  1.80  4.50  1.17  0.25  0.45  0.16 
Manufacturing: Vehicles  0.10  0.00  2.23  2.69  0.30  1.75  2.01  2.43  2.18  4.50  2.48  0.76  0.10  0.00 
Manufacturing: Other products  0.23  0.04  0.78  0.47  0.59  0.08  0.17  0.03  2.18  3.00  1.20  2.50  0.08  0.00 
Manufacturing: Paper and paper products  0.77  0.90  1.77  0.79  0.14  0.02  0.79  0.21  1.53  3.86  0.75  0.02  0.32  0.26 
Manufacturing: Rubber products  0.33  0.02  0.81  0.00     0.52  0.25  1.12  2.86  0.75  0.73  0.11  0.03 
Manufacturing: Textiles and related items  0.58  0.43  1.46  0.56  0.61  0.26  1.99  1.17  1.50  0.76  2.89  1.54  0.38  0.45 
Construction and related activities  0.13  0.02  2.51  0.17  0.32  0.01  0.81  1.48  1.42  0.25  0.66  0.39  0.34  0.15 
Electricity   2.28  0.60  1.64  0.67  0.43  0.87  1.53  4.07  0.79  0.73  2.69  5.60  0.13  0.24 
Natural resource industries: minerals n.e.c  0.48  5.16  6.53  0.85  0.45  1.20  0.42  0.20  1.05  0.49  0.94  0.15  0.17  0.00 
Natural resource industries: Coal and lignite          0.30  0.01     0.16  0.50  0.99  2.12  1.48  1.03 
Natural resource industries: Marine foods  0.33  0.09     0.28  0.00  4.54 -0.38  0.36  0.11  1.55  0.27    
Natural resource industries: Floriculture  0.44 -0.60     0.36  0.04         2.42  1.87    
Natural resource Industries: Poultry and meat 
products 
0.68  3.76         0.65  0.06  1.43  0.41  0.32  0.00    
Natural resource industries: Granite  1.72 -0.68         1.45 -0.06  0.15  0.03  1.64  13.64    
Natural resource industries: Oil and Natural gas      -1.60  -0.29  0.71  0.14     0.35  1.17     0.46  0.06 
Natural resource industries: Tea      -0.40  0.04         0.40  2.48  0.53  0.00  1.28  0.02 
Services: Miscellaneous and n.e.c.  0.39  0.29  5.07  2.19  0.21  0.02  0.87  0.10  2.27  2.00  1.80  0.93  0.26  0.00 
Services: Business and consultancy  1.11  0.34  4.04  2.62  0.31  0.08  3.63  5.91  4.05  2.10  1.78  0.57  0.25  0.19  
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Services: Computer software  2.23  2.76  2.05  0.50  0.32  0.44  4.41  6.16  2.87  3.35  1.96  0.91  0.31  0.05 
Services: Entertainment and related industries  0.31  0.03  2.23  0.65     0.37  0.03  1.62  2.80  0.71  0.04    
Serivces: Financial  0.43  0.42  3.74  1.03  0.13  0.21  0.68  1.02  3.85  6.41  0.68  0.35  0.26  0.10 
Services: Health and related  0.58  0.04  2.44  0.59  0.09  0.01  0.89  0.04  1.02  1.57  0.76  0.94  0.49  0.09 
Services: Hotels and restaurants  0.12  0.00  2.69  1.02  0.11  0.01  0.82  0.18  1.80  3.37  1.89  1.89  0.18  0.19 
Services: Publishing, newspapers and periodicals      38.92  -0.44         0.51  0.11  0.64  1.40    
Services: Real estate, commerical complexes, 
tourism 
0.30  0.25  2.30  0.19  0.53  1.76  0.93  1.93  2.23  0.83  0.84  2.70  0.25  0.18 
Services: Trading and related activities  0.12  0.34  3.09  2.55  0.46  0.01  1.10  0.29  2.13  0.59  1.59  0.17  0.18  0.00 
Services: Telecommunication  and related  0.41  0.17  4.87  3.87  0.22  0.41  1.33  0.14  3.38  7.25  1.39  0.84  0.13  0.07 
Services: Transportation including by air, road, 
shipping and courier services, storage and 
distribution 
0.76  4.10  1.73  0.56  0.71  1.41  0.51  0.02  3.56  4.37  1.55  0.53  0.44  0.10 
Unclassified  1.02  0.24  1.52  0.34  0.26  0.09  0.97  0.91  2.21  0.66  1.14  0.42  0.07  0.15 
NB: A (No of Cases) B (Foreign Equity Share Capital); Predicted Values are arrived at by a panel regression with growth in SDP of 1996 over 1993 
(log(SDP96/SDP93), and SDP for 1993, with industry dummies. The regression explains 18% of the variation. See Table... for details. Negative values 
arise when the predictions are negative for the state. 
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Table 9: Results of Regression of No. of Cases of Purely Technical 
Collaborations in Each State Over SDP of the State in 1993 at 
Constant 1993-94 Prices, Growth in SDP and Industry Dummies 
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Sig.level 
Constant  -7.9293  -1.3997  0.1627 
SDP93  1.999E-6  6.7867  0.0000 
Log(SDP96/SDP93)  17.9844  1.4281  0.1544 
Industry Dummies (37)  -  -  - 
R
2 adjusted      0.2479 
R
2       0.3416 
No. of Obs.      322 
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Table 10: Ratio of Actual to Predicted Value of No of Cases, and No. of Cases  Across Industry Groups for Certain States, Pertaining to all Non-
financial Technical Collaborations Approved Since 1991 
Industry Group  AP  DEL  GUJ  KAR  MAH  TN  WB 
  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B  A  B 
Manufacturing: Other, miscellaneous and unclassified  4  0.52  11  6.05  8  0.87  5  1.03  15  0.78  4  0.49  2  0.27 
Manufacturing: Chemicals  35  1.16  13  0.53  90  2.84  36  1.32  146  3.51  55  1.79  24  0.80 
Manufacturing: Electronic equiments and related items  15  0.95  20  2.01  16  0.92  31  2.39  53  1.94  14  0.86  8  0.52 
Manufacturing: Food processing and related activities  3  0.49  10  33.53  1  0.13  5  1.51  16  0.91  6  0.91  1  0.17 
Manufacturing: Leather articles incl. footwear              2  0.67  5  0.29  2  0.32  2  0.36 
Manufacturing: Machinery of various kinds  22  0.63  32  1.09  70  1.91  55  1.70  207  4.44  85  2.39  19  0.55 
Manufacturing: Metals (aluminum)          1  0.35      4  0.31  2  1.07  2  1.83 
Manufacturing: Non metallic minerals  1  0.22      2  0.33  2  1.14  4  0.25  1  0.20     
Manufacturing: Metals (other)      2  -0.53      1  -1.36  5  0.37  1  0.39  2  1.13 
Manufacturing: other metal products  7  0.82  7  2.65  7  0.70  6  1.06  22  1.10  12  1.34  3  0.37 
Manufacturing: Vehicles  2  0.09  36  2.09  7  0.28  28  1.38  73  2.11  76  3.22  3  0.13 
Manufacturing: Other products  1  0.40  8  -2.37  2  0.50  1  -2.83  7  0.50  1  0.34  1  0.46 
Manufacturing: Paper and paper products  2  -1.78  1  -0.14          2  0.19         
Manufacturing: Rubber products  1  0.17  5  -192.65  4  0.55  2  0.67  6  0.35  10  1.59  2  0.36 
Manufacturing: Textiles and related items  1  0.12  7  2.61  9  0.90  12  2.11  29  1.45  3  0.33  2  0.24 
Construction and related activities  1  1.00  2  -0.41          4  0.32  1  0.68  1  1.48 
Electricity   4  0.94          2  1.41  3  0.19  1  0.21  2  0.51 
Natural resource industries: minerals n.e.c  1  0.24      3  0.53  1  0.76  4  0.26  2  0.43  2  0.52 
Natural resource industries: Coal and lignite      1  -0.31          1  0.07         
Natural resource industries: Marine foods                      1  0.81     
Natural resource industries: Floriculture  1  1.30          4  -1.58  5  0.43  1  1.30     
Natural resource Industries: Poultry and meat products                  1  1.00         
Natural resource industries: Granite          1  1.00                 
Natural resource industries: Oil and Natural gas          1  0.31          1  0.46  1  0.71 
Natural resource industries: Tea                      2  1.00     
Natural resource industries: Wood                  2  1.00         
Services: Miscellaneous and n.e.c.      18  18.68          13  0.71  1  0.14  1  0.15 
Services: Business and consultancy      19  11.11  3  0.33  4  0.85  22  1.16  3  0.37  1  0.14 
Services: Computer software  3  0.89  4  -1.61  1  0.21  2  3.74  3  0.20  1  0.26  2  0.66 
Services: Entertainment and related industries                1  -0.98  5  0.38  3  1.32  7  4.71 
Serivces: Financial  2  4.30  3  -0.56          2  0.17          
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Services: Health and related  1  0.72  3  -0.67  2  0.70  1  -0.69  2  0.16      1  0.94 
Services: Hotels and restaurants  1  0.11  18  5.46  5  0.47  6  0.95  18  0.87  13  1.35  6  0.68 
Services: Publishing, newspapers and periodicals  1  0.50  2  -0.52          1  0.07         
Services: Real estate, commerical complexes, tourism  1  0.33  1  -0.35      1  5.78  4  0.28         
Services: Trading and related activities      1  -0.22  2  0.70      2  0.16      1  0.97 
Services: Telecommunication  and related  1  0.20  6  -7.48  1  0.15  1  0.45  3  0.18  2  0.36  1  0.21 
Services: Transportation including by air, road, 
shipping and courier services, storage and distribution 
    4  -5.00  1  0.15  2  0.90  2  0.12  2  0.36  1  0.21 
Unclassified  2  0.30  22  24.20  2  0.24  7  1.78  17  0.93  4  0.55  1  0.16 
NB: A (No of Cases) B (Ratio of Actual to Predicted Values of No. of Cases); Predicted Values are arrived at by a panel regression with growth in SDP of 
1996 over 1993 (log(SDP96/SDP93), and SDP for 1993, with industry dummies. The regression explains 24% of the variation. See Table... for details. 
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AP BIH CHA DEL GOA GUJ HAR HP J&K KAR KER MP MAH MAN MEG ORI PON PUN RAJ TN UP WB
 
 
Figure 2: Gujarat 
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Figure 3 









Detrend of Log of NSDP, PAGR, SMA and
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Table 11: Growth Rates in Agriculture, 
Manufacturing and Net State Domestic 
Product at 1993-94 Constant Prices in Gujarat 
(% per annum) 
Year  Agriculture  Mfg  NSDP 
1990-91  -7.5  13.9 1.5 
1991-92  -19.6  -22.1 -8.3 
1992-93  56.0  64.1 32.2 
1993-94  -26.3  -3.0 -3.1 
1994-95  47.0  23.4 20.1 
1995-96  -13.5  8.5 3.0 
1996-97  38.4  14.5 15.2 
1997-98  -9.8  -11.3 -0.6 
1998-99  1.2  6.9 5.8 
1999-00  -33.0  9.0 -2.1 
2000-01  -14.9  3.1 1.1 
Source: Data from EPWRF, originally from CSO. 
 
 
 
 